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Cornell University 2017 
 
This dissertation takes the form of three papers. Each one can be read on its own, and I 
present them here in a format that lends itself to such reading. However, they also center around 
a common topic: how Immanuel Kant conceives of immorality and how this theory informs his 
understanding of morality.  
In the first paper, I argue that Kant does not think immorality in human beings is always 
interpersonally arrogant, focusing in particular on what Kant means by “self-conceit.” I argue 
that self-conceit is a happiness-emphasizing conception of self, in which one overvalues the 
inclinations. When life goes well, this self-conception and the standard of assessment it implies 
do lead to the opinion that one is worth more than others. When life goes badly, however, they 
lead to the opposite (and no less harmful) misunderstanding.  
In the second paper, I address another motivation for the claim that Kant thought 
interpersonal arrogance was the central moral problem for human beings: Kant’s theory of 
happiness. Kant held that human beings are competitive, as can be seen in several of his 
doctrines about how human beings conceive of and pursue happiness. I show how Kant explains 
this competitive bent in human nature while maintaining the thesis that human beings are 
interested in happiness only because it promises to be satisfying. I argue that Kant’s 
understanding of human rationality and of human interdependence result in competitiveness 
without the assumption that human beings are arrogant.  
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In the third paper, I turn to Kant’s theory of self-respect, using my understanding of Kant 
on immorality and arrogance to explain the importance of self-respect in his moral theory. I 
argue that self-respect is significant specifically because it is a way of valuing oneself that 
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Must “Self-Conceit” be Self-Conceited? 




In Act 3 of Lorraine Hansberry’s play A Raisin in the Sun, Walter Lee Younger tells his 
family that he thinks he should accept money from the white neighborhood committee pressuring 
them to leave the area. Although the family is on the verge of owning their house after 
generations of saving, financial troubles have hit, and the message from the neighborhood 
committee is clear: they are not welcome to stay. These are solid prudential reasons to leave. 
Walter’s family, however, suspects that they are not good enough: his mother asks him to think 
about how this decision will make him feel. What follows is initially a defense by Walter of his 
decision, but his defense gradually morphs into a caricature, a deliberate imitation of the 
obedient black man that the neighborhood committee wants him to be.   
In his monologue, Walter demonstrates to himself and to the audience of the play what 
his mother already knows: that there is an important, albeit unfair, sense in which his decision to 
take the money would be immoral. There is no straight-forward sense in which it would be 
arrogant. There is no straight-forward sense in which Walter would be placing his own needs and 
desires before the more important claims of other people. But in taking the money, Walter would 
be wronging himself.  
 Hansberry’s play is read by high-schoolers all over the United States, and it documents 
an experience that is in no way unheard of or exceptional. And yet when we think about 
immorality and about the characteristics that lead people to act immorally, we often overlook 
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cases like this one. Instead, we occupy ourselves with cases in which people hurt others and 
approach the world as though they were the only important thing in it. It is important to talk 
about these latter kinds of examples. Some of the most obvious cases of immoral action, ones we 
have an urgent need to address, seem to be driven by such arrogant disregard for other people. 
But it is not only arrogant people who find themselves with powerful temptations to act in ways 
that they themselves would consider, on reflection, to be immoral. 
Immanuel Kant was well aware of this. Despite his insistence that even the most common 
human understanding has access to the moral law, he acknowledges that many of us do the 
wrong thing sometimes, even when we know it’s wrong. Further, it seems that Kant should fully 
endorse the idea that people can be immoral by degrading themselves, not just by degrading 
others. But in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces as the root of our moral failings 
a tendency he calls “self-conceit” (Eigendünkel). Many authors have held that this tendency is a 
false understanding of ourselves which ranks us above all others, leading us to think that only 
our own wants and needs matter.1 This reading is understandable, given the name of the 
tendency and given Kant’s penchant for making our alleged preoccupation with our desires 
sound self-cherishing. “[I]f we look more closely at the intentions and aspirations in [human 
action],” he comments, “we everywhere come upon the dear self” (4:407). 
                                                          
1 Stephen Engstrom, Allen Wood, and Andrews Reath are three examples, whom I will discuss in section three. 
Even some authors who do not think that to be self-conceited is directly to rank oneself above others nonetheless 
agree that self-conceit must involve unconditional esteem for oneself that implicitly ranks oneself above others. 
Frederick Neuhouser (2008) affirms this sort of interpretation, for example, when he writes that people often 
misinterpret Rousseau’s concept of amour-propre because they take it to be the same as Kant’s concept of self-
conceit. As Neuhouser understands it, self-conceit “can be defined as taking one's own happiness—rather than the 
moral law, which also takes the happiness of others into account—as the supreme criterion for action [and] since this 
is in effect to regard oneself as worthier of happiness than others, it can plausibly be viewed as embodying an 
inflated sense of self-worth)” (61). Barbara Herman (2005), Christine Korsgaard (1998), and Stephen Darwall 
(2008) see self-conceit as a tendency to evaluate oneself positively no matter what. 
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But this view of immorality seems like it could be general only if we avert our eyes from 
cases like Walter’s.2 One possible reaction to this would be to conclude that Kant had a very 
limited and inaccurate understanding of immorality—and I am not going to argue here that his 
understanding of immorality was fully adequate to the complexity of human life. However, I 
think we underestimate Kant’s theory if we think it is limited in precisely this way. Kant 
acknowledges the moral dangers of degrading oneself, deferring automatically to authority, and 
generally failing to treat oneself as the equal of others. The command to respect oneself appears 
many times throughout his work, sometimes with what seems like over-zealous rigor. Even to 
sell your hair, he warns, might be to violate that duty (6:423). It would be surprising if this same 
philosopher had fallen prey to the error of thinking that immorality is only an issue for the 
arrogant—a doctrine that pairs naturally with the claim that to be morally good is to be humble 
and unpresupposing.  
In light of that, my project here will be to present and argue for a new interpretation of 
self-conceit as it appears in the third chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. According 
to my interpretation, Kant holds that we are self-conceited in only a rather technical sense. He 
holds that we assign too much (and the wrong kind of) importance to what he calls our 
                                                          
2 My argument relies on the assumption that it is worth-while to make sure theories of immorality encompass cases 
of immorality that are more likely to occur in highly non-ideal circumstances. My belief that this is true depends on 
a way of thinking about morality that I will not be defending in full here, and which is, I believe, somewhat different 
than the usual conception of it. There is a tendency, bolstered today by the ease with which social media facilitates 
public shaming, to think that granting that a person is engaging in something immoral is tantamount to singling them 
out for censure and punishment. This way of thinking of immorality makes morality itself out to be a kind of bat 
with which we cudgel each other when we do something wrong. I am not motivated, in this paper, by the idea that it 
is worthwhile to bring people into swinging distance of this bat. I think it is important to include the right kinds of 
actions and tendencies in our conception of immorality because many people are inspired, animated, and empowered 
by morally-loaded projects. Part of the reason I consider duties to oneself important is that such duties emphasize the 
fact that some of the important moral projects in our lives are self- and not other-regarding. Telling someone that 
they have a given moral obligation can certainly be a way of taking them down a notch, but it can also be a way of 
letting them know that they have a very good reason to try very hard to do something, even though it’s difficult. I 
recognize that these rather impressionistic comments are not enough to fully support the conception of morality I 
have in mind, but I hope that they help make clearer what worth there might be in trying to broaden instead of 
narrow our conception of immorality. 
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“inclinations:” we tend to assess our actions, ourselves, and our lives as though fulfilling these 
inclinations—and hence achieving happiness—were of primary importance. On this 
understanding of self-conceit, it can actually result in both overly low and overly high opinions 
of oneself, depending on how happy one is. This reading, I argue, is not only better suited to 
Kant’s texts overall, but also leaves him with a better moral theory than the standard alternative. 
In section 1, I outline the role self-conceit plays in Kant’s moral theory and argue that, in 
order to play this role, self-conceit must be a tendency found universally in human beings, and 
that it must play a significant part in all immoral action. In section 2, I argue that because both 
these claims must be true of self-conceit, we have good reason to hope that it is not the same as 
interpersonal arrogance.  
In sections 3 and 4, I discuss Kant’s claim that self-conceit is closely related to “all the 
inclinations taken together” and his claim that self-conceit results from our tendency to make 
self-love “lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle,” and explain how these passages 
work with my interpretation. In section 5, I argue that Kant’s texts reveal that he was very much 
aware of the human struggle with self-debasement and deference, as well as arrogance. I also 
explain how my reading of self-conceit encompasses both struggles.  
In section 6, I address the biggest worry for my reading: that it does not explain what 
exactly is self-conceited about self-conceit. I argue that even on my reading, there is still 
something self-conceited about the tendency. Although self-conceit does not entail that agents 
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1. Self-Conceit’s Role in Kant’s Moral Theory  
 
First, a caveat. Kant uses the word “self-conceit” throughout his work in different ways. 
For most of this paper, I am going to be focusing on only one of those uses. That instance occurs 
in the Critique of Practical Reason, in Kant’s discussion of “what [the moral law] effects (or, to 
put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive” (5:72). The tendency Kant calls 
self-conceit here is an important part of his story about how the moral law can be an incentive for 
us. Because my interpretation of self-conceit will focus on making sure that it can play its role in 
this story, I am going to explain what Kant means by incentive, and what it would mean for the 
moral law to be an incentive for us, in a little more detail.  
An incentive (Triebfeder) is something like a motivation: it moves a person to act.3  
Many of the incentives human beings experience come from what Kant calls their “sensibility.” 
We are sensible in that we are physical beings who can sense or be affected by the world around 
us. The facts about what we want to do are often determined by our sensibility: what tastes we 
like, what harms or nourishes us, what we find pleasant or unpleasant to experience. The desires 
we form on this basis are what Kant calls our “inclinations” (Neigungen).4 I am “inclined” to act 
in a certain way to the extent that my desire to act that way is based in my impression of how it 
would make me feel. The thought that a certain action would satisfy an inclination is often an 
incentive for human action. 
However, the things that human beings morally ought to do are determined not by their 
sensibility, but by their rational nature. This means that we are not always sensibly inclined to do 
                                                          
3 Kant defines it as “the subjective determining ground of the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature 
necessarily conform with the objective law” (5:72). 
4 See 4:414fn. Kant also sometimes refers to these as “sensible desires.” 
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what is morally right. Hence, although we always ought to act in accordance with the moral law, 
we do not always want (or decide) to do so. If the moral law can itself function as an incentive, 
however, then our awareness of what we ought to do can move us to act, independently 
inclination. Kant argues that the moral law can be an incentive. It becomes one, he explains, by 
calling up a moral feeling he calls “respect” (Achtung). This brings us back to the topic of self-
conceit: according to Kant, we experience respect for morality because the moral law strikes 
down self-conceit.  
In the following quote, Kant explains that self-conceit is one of two types of “self-regard” 
that are made up by our inclinations: 
All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system and the 
satisfaction of which is then called one’s own happiness) constitute regard for oneself 
(solopsismus). This is either the self-regard of love for oneself, a predominant 
benevolence toward oneself (Philautia), or that of satisfaction with oneself 
(Arrogantia). The former is called, in particular, self-love; the latter, self-conceit. 
(5:73)  
 
 It is, according to Kant, the moral law’s ability to limit self-love—and hence to 
delegitimize self-conceit—that leads us to experience respect for it: 
[The moral law] is… an object of respect inasmuch as, in opposition to its subjective 
antagonist, namely the inclinations in us, it weakens self-conceit; and inasmuch as it 
even strikes down self-conceit, that is, humiliates it, it is an object of the greatest 
respect and so too the ground of a positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and 
is cognized a priori. (5:73)5 
 
The victory of the moral law over all of the inclinations, and thereby over self-conceit, makes 
dramatically apparent to us the fact that in the face of moral considerations, all of our other 
concerns can become irrelevant or petty to us. Hence, we feel respect for the moral law. Our 
                                                          
5 Another similar description of this process occurs at 5:75-76: “[T]he representation of the moral law deprives self-
love of its influence and self-conceit of its illusion, and thereby the hindrance to pure practical reason is lessened 
and the representation of the superiority of its objective law to the impulses of sensibility is produced and hence, by 
removal of the counterweight, the relative weightiness of the law (with regard to a will affected by impulses) in the 
judgment of reason [is also produced].” 
             16 
 
respect is premised in part upon our previous (and recurring) impression that this could not 
happen. Our impression that our inclinations are all-important, an impression encoded precisely 
in our self-conceit, is part of what makes the moral law’s toppling of these considerations 
riveting.  
 Although self-conceit is a hindrance to morality, then, it is also an essential part of our 
experience of respect.6 This relationship between respect and self-conceit motivates two theses 
that support my reading of self-conceit. The first thesis is what I will call the Root thesis: 
Root: Self-conceit is the driving force behind human immorality. 
Because self-conceit is involved in the production of respect, and the moral law should be at 
least capable of calling up respect in the face of any temptation to act wrongly, self-conceit must 
be active in any case in which immoral actions seem attractive to human beings.  
 It may seem from what we have covered so far that self-love could incline people to act 
immorally on its own, and so that some immoral actions could be motivated purely by self-love 
instead of by any kind of self-conceit. However, Kant’s text indicates that the destruction of self-
conceit is particularly important. For example, in the passage above (5:73), Kant discusses 
exclusively the way our contemplation of the moral law interacts with our self-conceit, leaving 
self-love to the side. This emphasis makes sense because the limitation of self-love is precisely a 
limitation that prevents it from crossing over into self-conceit. It is only when self-love’s 
influence over us leads us to think that it should win out in conflicts with the moral law that it 
becomes problematic. In this sense, our immorality involves self-conceit. Our self-love is 
immoral only to the extent that it pushes us to become self-conceited.  
                                                          
6 Other commentators on self-conceit have taken note of the fact that Kant assigns it this dual role, as both harm and 
help to our moral agency. See for example, Stephen Engstrom (2010, 118); Barbara Herman (2005, 31). Camilla 
Serck-Hanssen (2005) presents a similar picture of our immoral tendencies, although her focus is on something Kant 
calls “radical evil,” instead of on self-conceit (see 65).  
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 So, if there are some immoral actions that do not have self-conceit at their basis, the fact 
that respect can only arise in cases in which the agent is subject to self-conceit would mean that 
there are some cases in which human beings considering immoral actions were incapable of 
experiencing respect.7 This would be bad for Kant. Although the details of what exactly respect 
is and what makes it important to moral action are controversial,8 he makes it clear that it is 
important. At times he writes as though without respect, it would be impossible for us even to 
think morally. He claims, for instance, that we “must have respect for the law within [ourselves] 
in order even to think of any duty whatsoever” (6:403), and refers to respect as that which 
represents actions as duties to us (6:402) and as “identical with consciousness of one’s duty” 
(6:464). Our respect for the law is also, for Kant, the source of our true respect for ourselves. 
Respect reveals to us that although we are capable of immoral actions, we are also the kinds of 
beings who are free to positively take an interest in acting morally well (5:80-81).9 This 
revelation about what we are calls up “reverence” for ourselves (5:87).  
 If Root were false, there would be some ways of being drawn to immoral action that 
would make it impossible for respect to reach us. Morality would be incapable of reminding a 
person in these circumstances of their own moral nature and calling them to action. Although this 
might not mean such agents could not act morally well at all, it would mean that they would 
                                                          
7 Engstrom also notes that Kant’s description of how respect arises depends upon the presence of self-conceit (2010, 
118). He argues, however, that this poses no problem for Kant’s theory of moral motivation because it is only due to 
self-conceit’s opposition to morality that any explanation of the moral law’s functioning as an incentive is required 
in the first place. Part of my argument in this paper is that only my reading of self-conceit can really allow for this 
defense because only it fully accounts for the subjective forces that oppose morality in us. 
8 The process that Kant describes in this part of the Critique clearly describes the arising of a feeling: it involves 
stages of pain, and Kant is explicit that respect depends upon “sensible feeling, which underlies all our inclinations” 
(5:75). But the process itself is also triggered by a judgment about what we ought (morally) to do. Commentators 
disagree about whether both the feeling and the judgment are necessary for moral behavior on Kant’s view, or 
whether only the judgment is needed. All authors, however, agree that respect is important, if not as a necessary 
component in moral action, then as an aid to such action and to the achievement of virtue. 
9 This observation is supported especially by Janelle DeWitt’s (2014) account of respect and Owen Ware’s (2014). 
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require other incentives (or perhaps a forceful, alienating will to obey) to motivate themselves to 
action. 
 The second thesis Kant needs because of the relationship he posits between self-conceit 
and respect is what I will call the Pervasive thesis: 
Pervasive: All human beings tend towards self-conceit. 
If it turned out that some human beings were not subject to self-conceit, these human beings 
would also not be capable of experiencing respect.10 This possibility is inconsistent with what 
Kant claims in the passage at hand. Further, if Root were true and Pervasive false, that would 
mean that, because all immorality had its source in self-conceit (as Root claims), and some 
human beings did not experience self-conceit (as the denial of Pervasive entails), some human 
beings would be free from the flaw that gives immorality much of its draw for human beings. 
Hence, they would be free from the struggle to avoid immorality. Aside from the fact that this 
seems implausible, Kant explicitly claims that no human beings are like this.  
 Root and Pervasive would be unnecessary if, in his discussion of respect, Kant indicated 
that this was just one way respect could be experienced. He does not do this. Hence, the error 
that he labels “self-conceit” must fulfill these theses. I have indicated that many interpretations 
of self-conceit analyze it as arrogance that assumes superiority over others—a kind of 
unconditional self-admiration that makes one’s own self seem to be the most important thing in 




                                                          
10 Pervasive also must be true in order for Kant to be right that we can know a priori—that is, independently of any 
empirical survey—that respect will arise in all people, as Kant also claims at 5:73. 
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2. Arrogance is Not Enough 
 
The standard reading of self-conceit cannot plausibly fulfill Pervasive because human 
beings do not all suffer from inextinguishable pride that comes at the expense of their proper 
respect for others. Some human beings are mired instead in self-doubt and the sense that they are 
not important. Feelings of worthlessness are listed as a symptom of major depressive episodes 
and disorders, for example.11 Human societies are also often laced with oppressive practices that 
impress upon some groups of people the claim that they are inferior. There is a large literature 
describing personal experiences with oppression and the way oppression targets one’s sense of 
self-worth.12  
Martin Luther King Jr.’s letter from Birmingham Jail provides one example. In the letter, 
King explains his impatience with those who are urging that he and others involved in the Civil 
Rights Movement be less aggressive in their call for change. The letter conveys a broad spectrum 
of factors that come together to make oppression demeaning:  
Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to 
say, "Wait." But… when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech 
stammering as you seek to explain to your six year old daughter why she can't go to 
the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears 
welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, 
and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky… 
when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading "white" and 
"colored"… when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodiness"—
then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait.13 
 
                                                          
11 See, for example, the American Psychiatric Association entry on depression at 
http://www.psychiatry.org/depression, as of 23 Jan. 2015. 
12 See, for instance, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), Albert Memmi’s Dominated Man (1971), 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), or, much more recently, George Yancy’s “Whiteness and the Return of the 
Black Body” (Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 2005), among others.  
13 The entire letter can be read at various websites online, including <http://www.drmartinlutherkingjr.com>, where 
many of King’s other speeches and writings can also be found. 
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Although the fact that some human beings are made to endure these kinds of conditions does not 
disprove Pervasive on the standard reading of self-conceit, it forces upon it the implausible 
corollary that even the individuals who wrote testimonies like this tended to think they were 
superior to others. This is, at the very least, a difficult position to maintain. It seems much more 
likely that, to the extent that individuals in these conditions struggle with a tendency to 
immorality (as Kant insists we all do), they would struggle with immorality in a form very unlike 
interpersonal arrogance. 
Further problems arise when we consider Root. If we read self-conceit as interpersonal 
arrogance, then Root claims that self-conceited pride is the moral problem for human beings. But 
debasement is an equally serious obstacle to human virtue.14 Consider the following case: a 
secretly insecure bully lashes out at her classmates not because she thinks they are putting on 
airs, but because she thinks they genuinely are smarter, more attractive, and overall better than 
she is. By scaring and hurting her classmates, she manages to gain a kind of respect from them 
that is, as far as she believes, the closest thing to equality with them that she could ever have. In 
her mind, this is the only way that she can avoid all of them noticing her (she believes) obvious 
flaws, teasing her, and laughing behind her back.  
There are other cases, even if this bully case seems implausible. Immoral action does not 
always involve directly harming others—it can also involve failing to stand up for them. For 
every bully, there will also likely be bystanders: people who believe that what is going on is 
wrong, and yet who cannot bring themselves to stop it. Here, a lack of self-importance can be 
                                                          
14 In addition, vanity does not always make sense as the primary target for moral criticism. In some circumstances, 
overinflated pride can actually serve as a kind of moral resource. The sense that one is important and valuable can 
actually make it easier to face up to particularly difficult moral obligations. When the morally required action 
requires a lot of effort and skill, it is precisely agents who are confident in their capacities, perhaps even those who 
think they are better than others, who may find it easier to do what they suspect they morally ought to do. Here I am 
extending the claim past the point where Kant would likely follow. However, I think the plausibility of this claim 
bolsters the intuition that it is an oversimplification to think of immorality as straight-forwardly arrogant. 
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just as morally dangerous as arrogance. The motivation behind bystanding can easily come in the 
form of trouble convincing oneself that one has the status, knowledge, or capacity to say that 
something is wrong. In any case, it seems like a misunderstanding of human nature to claim, as 
the combination of Root and the standard reading of self-conceit would lead us to claim, that it is 
much easier to be morally good when one is surrounded by circumstances that assault one’s 
sense of worth, instead of by circumstances that reinforce it. 
Because Kant wants self-conceit in his technical sense to play a role which requires it to 
fulfill both Pervasive and Root, we have reason to think more closely about what exactly is self-
conceited about it. In order to see whether or not Kant’s texts necessitate the standard 
interpretation, we have to return to the details of how exactly self-conceit works. 
 
3. Systems of Inclinations and Self-Conceit 
 
Self-conceit, recall, is one of the two types of self-regard that Kant claims are tightly 
related to our inclinations. In self-love (the first type of self-regard), our inclinations constitute 
our self-benevolence, whereas in self-conceit (the second type), they constitute our self-
satisfaction. There is something restrictedly appropriate, on Kant’s view, about our inclinations 
constituting self-benevolence (as they do in self-love), whereas they can never appropriately 
constitute self-satisfaction (as they do in self-conceit). He claims that the moral law only limits 
self-love, whereas it destroys self-conceit in a more thorough way (5:73). So far, though, we 
have not gone into much detail about exactly how inclinations are related to these two types of 
self-regard.  
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Stephen Engstrom (2010) offers one explanation of how our inclinations are involved in 
self-love. According to Engstrom, people develop self-love when they learn that they are a 
necessary condition of the pleasure they experience when they fulfill their inclinations. They 
come to care for themselves on this basis: as the subjects of their happiness. On Engstrom’s 
reading, self-benevolence is an attitude we have towards ourselves: a kind of affectionate feeling. 
However, Kant also sometimes discusses benevolence in terms of a program for action. When 
Kant discusses our duty to love our neighbors in the Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, he 
suggests that we ought to think about this duty as a duty to benevolence “as conduct” (6:401). 
Although we cannot control whether we feel emotional love towards other human beings, we can 
control how we treat them—and we must treat them well. When Kant claims that we tend to let 
our system of inclinations constitute our self-benevolence, he could mean that in self-love, we 
allow our inclinations to similarly influence our actions. In other words, self-love could amount 
to adopting a commitment to act in accordance with inclination—to care well for oneself 
specifically as a being with sensible wants and needs. 
On either Engstrom’s reading or the conduct reading, self-love is not completely 
misguided. We are sensible beings with inclinations, and we value that aspect of ourselves. That, 
however, is not all we are. So the moral law limits self-love. It adds a proviso: inclinations may 
guide our action or ground love for ourselves, but they cannot do it alone—they must be 
regulated, in turn, by the moral law. 
In the case of self-conceit, however, inclinations are tied up not with the agent’s self-
benevolence, but rather with their “self-satisfaction.” Kant uses this term interchangeably with 
“self-esteem.” The esteem of self-esteem differs from the love of self-love in that esteem 
involves a positive assessment of something. We must compare esteemed objects to some 
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standard, and they must earn their esteem by comparing well.15 It is this kind of earned self-
assessment which, according to Kant, our system of inclinations ought not even partially 
constitute. But there is an open question about how our inclinations could in any sense constitute 
(however mistakenly) such an assessment. Some leap of reasoning is required to move from facts 
about what one wants to a conclusion about what kind of esteem one has earned. 
According to Engstrom, our inclinations play a role in our (self-conceited) self-
assessment when we take the mere fact that we have a conception of happiness as confirmation 
that we are superior to others. As he explains it, in self-conceit, we come to think of ourselves 
“as worthy of esteem on account of [our] cognitive power… to determine an end” and form 
conceptions of the good (2010, 108). But, as we noted, esteem requires a point of comparison 
against which the esteemed object looks good, and the observation that one has the power to set 
ends does not readily suggest one. Engstrom concludes that “[s]elf-conceit’s esteem for self can 
therefore only be indirect, through depreciatory judgments concerning others” (109). In other 
words, the self-satisfaction we build in self-conceit can only be built on the belief that our 
capacities prove others inferior. Thus, self-conceit must be arrogance of the kind that assumes 
superiority over others.  
Engstrom is not alone in thinking that self-conceit must have something to do with a 
judgment that we are better than other people. According to Allen Wood (1999), for example, 
Kant believes that human beings first learn to esteem themselves on the basis of their superiority 
over nonrational animals. This leads them to want to use similar grounds to claim superiority 
over other human beings, and this illicit claim is what Kant means by self-conceit (241). 
                                                          
15 Engstrom also notes this characteristic of esteem, in contrast to affection (see 2010, 109). He makes the further 
point that esteem as an aesthetic judgment is also relative to the subject: “it lies in feeling, in one’s consciousness of 
the effect one’s own comparison of the object with oneself has upon oneself” (ibid). I am going to be leaving the 
aesthetic aspect of judgments of esteem implicit in this discussion—I believe nothing turns on it for my purposes. 
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Andrews Reath (2006) also sees self-conceit as interpersonal arrogance, describing it as “a 
disposition to assign oneself a standing to treat oneself and one’s subjective concerns as 
objective reasons that one does not and cannot acknowledge in others…to accord oneself a 
special standing to make claims on one’s own behalf in virtue of one’s superior worth” (25, 
emphasis mine). 
However, this is not the only way to explain the relationship our inclinations have to our 
self-assessment. Instead, we can understand self-conceit as a tendency to overvalue our own 
inclinations, taking the conception of happiness they help us construct as a guide for how to earn 
esteem for ourselves.16 This reading of self-conceit still respects the observation that esteem 
requires comparison. Instead of supposing that self-conceited agents take others as their point of 
comparison, however, it suggests that they esteem themselves based on how well their actual 
state matches up with the ideal state of happiness they construct on the basis of all of their 
inclinations taken together. In other words, they tend to mistake the measure of their happiness 
for the measure of their worth.  
At this point it is important to note that when Kant speaks of “happiness” he does not 
mean only simple and object-related pleasures. One important component of human happiness, 
according to Kant, is good relationships with others (which presuppose at least their having the 
opinion that we are their equals). This means that what others think of us and how they relate to 
us is in no sense irrelevant to our level of happiness. Human happiness is also, as Kant explains 
elsewhere (6:27), comparative: our judgments about how happy we are depend on how other 
                                                          
16 This interpretation makes the relationship between self-esteem and inclinations similar to the relationship between 
self-benevolence and inclinations as I suggested we understand it. In both cases, the inclinations are used to present 
a program for action. In the case of self-benevolence, the program is one that the agent adopts as what they will do; 
in the case of self-esteem, the program is one that the agent adopts as (in addition) what they believe they ought to 
do.  
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people around us are doing. On the current reading of self-conceit, in other words, self-conceited 
human beings are not released entirely from the tendency to compare themselves with others—
they do so in order to assess their own happiness, and then the resulting judgment about how 
happy they are feeds into their conception of themselves as of high or low worth. What I wish to 
make clear in my reading is that it is not this first move, in which the human being finds themself 
more or less happy depending on how their own state compares to those around them, that is 
“self-conceited” on Kant’s view. Comparisons with others in and of themselves are not 
problematic, on Kant’s view.17 The move that constitutes self-conceit is the one that follows this, 
in which the agent takes this judgment as evidence (or acts as though this judgment constituted 
evidence) of the worth of their person.  
The problem with this latter tendency is that although comparisons between our current 
and our ideal level of happiness can furnish us with useful information about how we might want 
to proceed if we want to be happy, these comparisons cannot serve as adequate grounds for a 
judgment about our worth. The worth of human beings comes, according to Kant, in the form of 
dignity—not in the form of price (4:435). This means that no judgment about my ability to 
secure happiness, for myself or for others, can justify the claim that I am of a lower (or higher) 
overall worth than other human beings.  
If it is a fact that we have a moral obligation to resist our own tendency to allow others’ 
attempts to convince us that we are not of worth to work, this fact by itself does not justify the 
claim that we should put our energy into strengthening our own sense or worth and not into 
resisting their attacks on us more directly. It would still make sense to resist these attacks both in 
                                                          
17 I argue elsewhere [Paper Two] that this comparativity is due to the way humans use their rational capacities to 
extend and alter their originally instinctively determined desires, and that it does not indicate that people are actually 
directly concerned with being better than other people. 
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light of the human imperfections that can help make these attacks so effective and in light of the 
fact that these attacks are wrong, independently of whether they tend to lower the victim’s sense 
of self-worth. So, for instance, it seems entirely consistent to say that Martin Luther King Jr. was 
morally right in insisting on his own worth in the face of conditions he faced as a black 
American man in the 60s and that he was morally right in making it his mission to dismantle the 
system of injustices that made it difficult for him and for many others to pursue happiness and 
maintain a sense of human dignity. 
The claim that people tend to measure their worth in terms of their happiness may seem 
unintuitive. However, if we examine it more closely, we will see that it is actually rather familiar. 
Even if we do not fully consciously endorse this claim, many of our natural reactions to 
happiness and unhappiness seem to presuppose it. It is not uncommon to conclude directly from 
one’s achievement of happiness that its mere existence proves that one has earned it—and that 
having thus earned happiness means that one deserves esteem. This is one of the facts about us 
that makes it difficult for us to recognize our privileges. We tend to feel proud of ourselves for 
being able to acquire the things we want—even in cases in which the acquisition had little to do 
with our own skill and in which the things we want are not particularly morally admirable.  
We can see this familiar leap of reasoning in the old poem: “Little Jack Horner sat in the 
corner, eating a Christmas pie; he put in his thumb, and pulled out a plum, and said, ‘What a 
good boy am I!’” Kant sees this as a natural way to think, too. He notes that “[p]ower, riches, 
honor, even health and that complete well-being and satisfaction with one’s condition called 
happiness, produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well unless a good will is present 
which corrects the influence of these on the mind” (4:393).  
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Just as the good life can feed into arrogance, circumstances which compromise happiness 
can feed into a sense of personal worthlessness. Here we can turn again to oppressive social 
conditions as an example. Oppression is often accompanied by intense restrictions on the 
abilities of people to pursue important components of their conceptions of happiness. Some 
forms of oppression trap individuals in poverty or refuse them the chance to pursue education 
and satisfying careers. These conditions place limits on the extent to which oppressed individuals 
can achieve the kind of happy state that fuels pride so naturally, according to Kant, and 
maintaining a base-line of self-esteem in these conditions can be very difficult. Unsurprisingly, 
movements working to change conditions for oppressed people often focus especially on pride. 
It is actually quite natural for human beings to weave together their state of happiness and 
their sense of value as a person. Arrogance is a vice that tends to assail us when we look around 
ourselves and see luxury and endless opportunities—but when we find ourselves struggling to 
make ends meet, it is more likely that we will have to fight to convince ourselves we still deserve 
to be treated with respect. Since the error Kant calls “self-conceit” is supposed to be something 
to which all human beings are subject, it would be good for Kant’s theory if the error he meant to 
refer to was this tendency to respect oneself (or chastise oneself) on the basis of one’s prudential 
achievements alone. 
It seems more plausible that this tendency would fulfill Pervasive, then. On my proposed 
reading, Kant would hold that this tendency was also at the root of immoral actions in human 
beings, and it would be a tendency we are subject to because we are morally imperfect. Before I 
proceed on to my discussion of another part of Kant’s description of self-conceit, I want to make 
a few comments concerning my reading of self-conceit and Root. There is an uncomfortable 
consequence to my insistence that self-conceit in my sense does a better job fulfilling Root than 
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self-conceit in the interpersonal sense. My reading of self-conceit, by encompassing some cases 
in which agents have had their sense of personal worth undermined by oppressive conditions, 
implies that oppression is sometimes made more devastatingly effective by the moral 
imperfection of those being oppressed.  
I want to emphasize that this claim is not the same as the claim that practices like 
oppression are only harmful to people if they are morally flawed or morally flawed in the 
specific way I have outlined here. The disadvantages and losses that come along with oppression 
are harms, the pain of which cannot be removed merely by the reassurance that these harms do 
not make one any less morally worthy a person. These harms on their own are also part of what 
makes oppression wrong, even on a Kantian view. Interfering with the ability of other human 
beings to pursue their happiness runs directly against the injunction to treat them as ends in 
themselves, and there is excellent reason to attempt to put a stop to these practices which has 
nothing to do with self-conceit.  
I also do not think that oppression only interferes with one’s sense of worth to the extent 
that one is subject to what we are here calling “self-conceit.” A person’s sense of self-worth can 
also be threatened by being surrounded by people who consistently tell them or imply to them 
that they are inferior, simply because basic intellectual humility makes its hard to dismiss any 
claim that the majority of one’s peers seem to endorse. For all I have said here, these cases might 
remain outside the scope of Kant’s analysis of immorality (which we might not find 
objectionable). My aim here has not been to show that Kant’s analysis of immorality will 
encompass all cases of uncertainty about one’s worth, or that it explains oppression. Instead, 
what I have aimed to show is that his analysis of self-conceit is consistent with the reality that 
some immoral actions are accompanied and encouraged by overly low instead of overly high 
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opinions of oneself, since both of these can constitute what he calls “self-conceit” in different 
conditions.  
And finally, I want to note that even though the very different kinds of obstacles to 
morally good action I have discussed here can all be brought under the umbrella of self-conceit, 
this does not mean that they are in other respects on a par with each other. For instance, we 
might think (although I will not be arguing that Kant thought this) that this analysis of self-
conceit supports the idea that the worth-undermining version of self-conceit is more difficult to 
overcome than the worth-inflating version of it is. By elevating our inclinations to the level of 
supreme moral importance, self-conceit makes it even more difficult that it already would be for 
us to act morally well in opposition to inclination. Effectively, it amplifies the already loud 
volume of our wants and needs. We might think that the results of this amplification are worse 
for those who are unhappy. Arguably, our desire to be at least tolerably happy might be more 
urgent and forceful than our desire to sustain and increase already affirming levels of happiness, 
so the moral challenge of resisting an amped-up version of the former might be significantly 
higher than the challenge of resisting an amped-up version of the latter.  
At this point, then, I only mean to have shown that the alternative reading of self-conceit 
I have presented here is more suited to the fact that human beings are not all arrogant and to the 
fact that conditions that suppress self-esteem are not conditions that thereby make morality 
easier. Moral obstacles can be propped up by dejection just as easily as they can be propped up 
by arrogance, and my proposed reading of self-conceit allows for this by allowing for the 
possibility that what Kant calls “self-conceited” thinking can manifest itself as dejection rather 
than as arrogance, especially when circumstances are not good. My proposed reading of self-
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conceit remains promising when we turn to Kant’s description of the error that underlies our 
tendency to be subject to self-conceit. 
 
4. Errors in Law-Making 
 
 Before I explicate Kant’ description of the erroneous thinking underlying self-conceit in 
more detail, a brief note on Kant’s vocabulary is necessary. In this passage, “subjective 
determining grounds of choice” refers to our inclinations. These are “subjective” in the sense that 
they are what happens to be the case for each of us, based on our own experience of what is 
pleasurable and what is not. An “objective determining ground,” however, is something we have 
reason to act on not because of our personal preferences, but because of sharable, universal 
considerations. So, when Kant contrasts ourselves “as having subjective determining grounds of 
choice” with ourselves “as having objective” ones, he is contrasting our physical selves with our 
purely rational or moral selves.  
According to Kant, we are led into self-conceit by the following error: 
[W]e find our nature as sensible beings so constituted that…objects of inclination, 
whether of hope or fear… [come to] us, and we find our [sensible] self, even though 
it is quite unfit to give universal law through its maxims, nevertheless striving 
antecedently to make its claims primary and originally valid, just as if it constituted 
our entire self. This propensity to make oneself as having subjective determining 
grounds of choice into the objective determining ground of the will in general can be 
called self-love; and if self-love makes itself lawgiving and the unconditional 
practical principle, it can be called self-conceit. (5:74) 
 
Because of the powerful impression that our physical existence makes upon us, Kant claims, 
people act as though their inclinations justify objective laws for what he calls “the will in 
general”.  
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 The German phrase Kant uses, “des Willens überhaupt,” is ambiguous, as is the English 
translation, between something like “the wills of all rational beings,” and something like “the 
will generally.” These two options lead to two very different ways of understanding what it 
means to make the claims of self-love into something law-giving for the will in general. If we 
understand “the will in general” as a general will encompassing all rational beings, then making 
the claims of our self-love law-giving would have implications for the wills of others in 
particular. In that case, self-conceited agents would make self-love law-giving by legislating it to 
other agents, claiming that they are required to serve the self-conceited agent’s self-love.  
 If we understand “the will in general” as the agent’s own will generally, on the other 
hand, then making self-love lawgiving would have implications primarily for self-conceited 
agents themselves. The self-conceited agent would legislate their own self-love to themself, 
requiring of themself that they serve it, with all the force with which they are actually required to 
obey the moral law.18  
 This distinction between the two ways we might think of human beings as mis-assigning 
ought-claims gets to the root of the difference between self-conceit understood as interpersonal 
arrogance and self-conceit understood as an overvaluation of inclinations. In the first case, what 
is objectionable about self-conceit is precisely the agent’s orientation towards others. Their error 
is thinking that others owe them too much and that they owe others too little. This understanding 
of self-conceit, then, fits most naturally with Kant’s text if we understand law-giving in the first 
sense, as giving laws (or assigning ought-claims) to others. On that reading as a whole, the 
mistake that the self-conceited agent makes is in thinking that everyone else is required to serve 
them, without any thought to what is owed in return. 
                                                          
18 Andrews Reath (2006) also introduces this distinction between two ways of legislating self-love (24). Reath 
prefers the second reading, whereas I will be arguing here for the first. 
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In my proposed alternative, self-conceited agents make an error about the significance of 
their own inclinations for themselves—not (directly) a mistake about what others owe them. And 
our second model of legislation only requires each agent to look out for themself, implying at 
most that each person’s own inclinations are important to that person. What is being asserted in 
this case is not really the value of any one individual over others, but rather the superior 
importance of the inclinations of each individual over the other components that make them up. 
In assigning self-love as an objective law to themselves, self-conceited agents also assign 
themselves a standard against which they can measure up well or poorly: the standard requires 
them to satisfy their inclinations, and hence, to be happy. 
I am going to label these two readings of self-conceit as follows:  
(Personal)Self-Conceit: Unconditional satisfaction with oneself, seeing oneself as 
superior to others, out of the implicit belief that one’s own self-love is lawgiving for 
all agents and that one must therefore have a privileged value compared to others.  
 
(Sensible)Self-Conceit: Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with oneself premised solely 
on how happy one is, based in the implicit belief that one’s self-love is lawgiving for 
oneself and that one’s inclinations are of privileged value compared to one’s other 
characteristics.  
 
Most commentators have understood self-conceit in the (Personal)Self-Conceit way.19 One 
reason (Personal)Self-Conceit is appealing is that it sounds a lot more like what we usually mean 
when we call someone self-conceited. I will discuss that problem for (Sensible)Self-Conceit in 
                                                          
19 Not all recent authors have readings of self-conceit which follow (Personal)Self-Conceit. For example, Owen 
Ware (2013) argues against the claim that self-conceit is identical to a tendency to think of oneself as superior to 
other human beings. On the other hand, Ware does not draw out the ambiguities I have noted here and does not see 
self-conceit as an immoral tendency (see 2013; 2, 11, and 18), whereas I do. There are also authors who see 
immorality in Kant’s theory as embodied by something more like (Sensible)Self-Conceit than (Personal)Self-
Conceit, but who focus entirely on what Kant calls “radical evil” and do not directly engage with self-conceit and its 
role in the production of respect. In their assessment of radical evil, Pablo Muchnik (2009) and Jeanine Grenberg 
(2005) both emphasize the fact that it cannot be fully understood on the model of interpersonal arrogance. Because 
(Sensible)Self-Conceit does have moral implications and thus is tied to Kant’s writing on radical evil and 
immorality in general, it seems to be friendly to these views. Yet another author who rejects the characterization of 
self-conceit as primarily rooted in arrogance is Kate Moran (2014). I discuss her work in more detail in footnote 24. 
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Section 6. Another reason (Personal)Self-Conceit is appealing, however, is that it frames Kant’s 
moral theory in a way that is more amenable to contemporary moral thought. Kant’s portrayal of 
the immoral person as someone who unduly prioritizes sensibility and his claim that the moral 
problem with humanity is our tendency to neglect our own rationality seems to miss the fact that 
morality has important things to say about how we relate to others. (Personal)Self-Conceit helps 
with this problem by framing the overvaluing of sensibility as really just a way of valuing 
oneself over others. Since it is much easier for us to see how the person who demands that others 
bend to their will is immoral, (Personal)Self-Conceit seems to bring Kant’s theory closer to 
common-sense morality. However, I have shown that (Personal)Self-Conceit is inconsistent with 
both the Root and Pervasive theses in ways that reveal it to fall short of the conception of 
immorality we want, even in common-sense terms. Turning to the text, we will see that it also 
falls short of the conception of immorality Kant wanted. 
 
5. Textual Problems for (Personal)Self-Conceit 
Kant indicates in a variety of texts that he is concerned about the human tendency to 
belittle oneself. One such text is Kant’s “An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?” In 
this text, Kant describes enlightenment as “the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred 
minority20” (8:35). A self-incurred minority is, according to Kant, a state in which one refuses to 
use one’s own reasoning “not [because of] lack of understanding but [because] of lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another” (8:35). Kant does not label self-
incurred minority a moral flaw. However, it is only in emerging from this condition that human 
beings can think for themselves and confidently use their own reason. Since using one’s own 
                                                          
20 This is “minority” in the sense of being a “minor” or child. 
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reason is essential to moral behavior according to Kant, self-incurred minority functions as an 
obstacle to moral virtue, and thus as something respect ought to be able to aid humans in 
overcoming.21  
Kant’s concern about our tendency to think too little of ourselves is also displayed in his 
discussion of duties to the self in the Metaphysics of Morals. In his justifications for the 
prohibitions against suicide, masturbation, excessive use of drugs and alcohol, and even lying 
and avarice, Kant insists that the problem with these actions is that they degrade or “throw away” 
one’s self. These actions and states, according to Kant, are morally unacceptable because they 
make one into a “mere means” (6:423) and “like a mere animal” (6:427); they “debase” one 
“beneath the beasts” (6:425) and leave one with “even less worth than… a mere thing” (6:430). 
Kant could not have thought that the mistaken psychology that permits these acts always 
involves the assertion that the agent in question is better than all other rational beings. 
Kant’s discussion of servility is also illuminating. Servility is Kant’s word for the state 
we are in when we fail to demand decent treatment from others. Behaving servilely, according to 
Kant, violates the moral requirement not to let our “insignificance as a human animal… infringe 
upon [our] consciousness of [our] dignity as a rational human being” (6:435). Kant even 
suggests that this flaw is more pervasive in people than arrogance. At the end of his discussion of 
servility, Kant considers a worry about the “elation of spirit” or “esteem for [oneself]” that arises 
in proper moral respect. The worry is that such esteem is too similar to arrogant self-conceit and 
that as a result, humans would do better to try to temper it (6:437). He responds that, on the 
                                                          
21 To the extent that an agent in a self-incurred minority fails to use reasoning at all, of course, they would be unable 
even to arrive at the “I ought” judgment that must precede the feeling of respect. However, I think this is an 
exaggeration of what such a condition would require. Kant believes that human beings are moral creatures, after 
all—it is more likely that agents in self-incurred minorities would attempt to suppress their own judgments, avoid 
acting on them, and try to bend them to the judgments of others. 
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contrary, the pervasiveness of courtly and ritualistic deference to authority seems to “prove there 
is a widespread propensity to servility in human beings” (6:437). 
In some of Kant’s four examples of moral action in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, he also seems to indicate more of a concern with what an agent’s self-legislation 
implies for their self-respect, than for what it implies for their respect of others. Consider first the 
example of the unfortunate man who “wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving 
it, not from inclination or fear but from duty” (4:398). Kant writes that the reason suicide is not 
permissible in this case is that the man is a human being, and “[a] human being… is not a 
thing… [and] cannot, therefore, dispose of a human being in [his] own person by maiming, 
damaging or killing him” (4:429).22 There are other ways Kant could have assessed this case, 
many of which would have attached the wrongness of the man’s potential suicide to an elevation 
of his own wants and needs over those of others. He could have pointed out the likelihood that 
the man’s suicide would cause others sadness or guilt, or referred to a duty not to abandon 
others.23 The most salient thing to Kant, however, was that the man could not commit suicide 
and respect himself.  
All these elements in the text run against (Personal)Self-Conceit, according to which the 
conflict between self-conceit and the moral law comes down to a conflict between selfish 
arrogance and an appreciation for the needs of others. (Sensible)Self-Conceit has a textual 




                                                          
22 The example of the man who fails to develop his talents has a similar structure (see 4:430). 
23 Kant was aware of these possible lines—see 6:422. 
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6.  (Sensible)Self-Conceit and the Text 
 
If we read self-conceit as (Sensible)Self-Conceit, we read Kant as saying that those who 
are self-conceited make the mistake of associating how happy they are with how good they are or 
how much they are worth. This means that for lucky individuals who are able to achieve what 
they want in life, their luck will be accompanied by arrogance. These individuals will believe 
themselves to be living up to the highest standard set for human beings and will believe they 
have earned superiority over anyone who has not done so. 
But (Sensible)Self-Conceit also allows for the possibility that humans will be 
discontented with themselves and view those around them as more worthy of respect than they 
are. The false standard set by (Sensible)Self-Conceit dictates that anyone who is particularly 
unhappy is failing to do what they ought to do as a human being. It implies that such unhappy 
individuals are not as valuable as other people: if they need to degrade themselves before others 
in order to achieve their basic wants and needs, then, according to (Sensible)Self-Conceit, this is 
exactly the behavior that is appropriate for them. In other words, (Sensible)Self-Conceit also 
encourages servility and other wrongs motivated by a sense of worthlessness. Both the reminder 
to respect others and the reminder to respect oneself are capable of striking down (Sensible)Self-
Conceit.  
There is one very obvious textual problem for (Sensible)Self-Conceit, however. Kant 
chose to call this tendency “eigendünkel”: that is, quite straight-forwardly, self-conceit. Kant 
uses this term elsewhere in a variety of ways. Demanding that others respect one more than they 
respect themselves (6:462), crediting oneself with a good will when in fact one has only been 
wishing to do good things (27:358), and assuming that one can fulfill the moral law “quite purely 
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by [one’s] own efforts” (without the aid of God) (27:350), among others, are all labeled self-
conceit. These things are not identical, but they all involve assigning credit where it is not due. 
On the face of it, this works against my hope that Kant has given us an account of immorality 
that goes beyond other-degrading arrogance. However, on closer inspection, my reading of self-
conceit as it appears in the second Critique does fit in among these other uses of the term. 
After Kant has introduced the feeling of respect, he emphasizes the importance of the fact 
that we feel respect, instead of spontaneous liking, for the moral law: 
The moral level on which a human being… stands is respect for the moral law. The 
disposition incumbent upon him to have in observing it is to do so from duty, not 
from voluntary liking or [as something he] undertakes unbidden, gladly and of his 
own accord; and his proper moral condition, in which he can always be, is virtue, that 
is, moral disposition in conflict, and not holiness in the supposed possession of a 
complete purity of dispositions of the will. (5:84) 
 
Here, Kant explains that respect for the moral law stands in contrast to another type of 
disposition toward morality, which is not possible for us: liking. But in (Sensible)Self-Conceit, 
we presume that we have exactly such a disposition. By identifying what the moral law 
commands of us with what we want, we act as though we have the sort of nature that naturally 
aligns perfectly with the moral law. In a sense, this is arrogant. 
Kant uses the term “self-conceit” to refer to this variety of arrogance elsewhere. He uses 
self-conceit in this way, for example, in his discussion of “moral enthusiasm,” which involves 
the insistence that morally good actions are done (or should be done) from liking: 
By exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, minds are attuned to 
nothing but moral enthusiasm and exaggerated self-conceit; by such exhortations they 
are led into the delusion that it is not duty—that is, respect for the law whose yoke… 
they must bear, even if reluctantly—which constitutes the determining ground of their 
actions… but that it is as if those actions are expected from them, not from duty but 
as base merit. (5:84-5) 
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This way of thinking leads people, according to Kant, to a “fantastic cast of mind, flattering 
themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle” (5:85). The 
problem with thinking that we are naturally morally good in this way is not that it would be 
unfortunate if it were true. The problem is that it is not true. In acting as though it were, we end 
up being morally careless. The type of arrogance that Kant calls self-conceit in this passage is 
exactly the type of arrogance implicit in (Sensible)Self-Conceit.  
In noting that self-conceit is arrogant in this regard, I approach another contemporary 
interpretation of self-conceit in Kant. Kate Moran (2014) argues that self-conceit involves a 
warping of moral principles designed to make sure that we can always reassure ourselves that we 
are perfectly virtuous. 24 This in turn leads self-conceited agents to demand too much respect of 
others (if they happen to be around), since self-conceited agents believe they are perfect and 
hence morally superior to (imperfect) others. Nonetheless, self-conceit is not fundamentally the 
arrogant assertion of oneself over others (see 434). On my understanding, by contrast, self-
conceited agents elevate their wants into law-like obligations. While this guarantees that they 
will never doubt that they are attempting to do the morally best thing, it does not, as I understand 
it, mean that they will always judge themselves to be morally successful. This is so because of an 
                                                          
24 Moran supports her reading in part by pointing out that self-conceit is described as solipsistic, and by drawing a 
comparison between moral self-conceit and logical self-conceit. In both cases, the agent isolates themself by 
refusing to accept the disagreeing judgments of others, perceiving themself to be correct (logically sound or morally 
good) despite their lack of real evidence. I do not think Kant always means exactly the same thing by “self-conceit,” 
so this line of argument exerts somewhat less pressure on my own reading. However, it is also worth noting that 
self-conceit is still solipsistic on the (Sensible)Self-Conceit reading, in the sense that the agent thinks that they alone 
have access to their moral obligations and their moral condition (only they can know whether or not they are happy, 
after all, and inclinations are private evidence, which only provide information about what is required of the agent 
themself). My reading can also maintain a close parallel between logical and moral self-conceit in that both cases 
assign mere whims (the logician’s faulty reasoning and the agent’s desires) more legitimacy than they deserve, 
ignoring the fact that these things (the reasoning or the desires) are not universalizable. My reading just will not 
support the claim that the self-conceited agent, in so isolating themself, guarantees a positive self-assessment. 
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important difference between the way that moral decisions (or acts of willing) and prudential 
decisions (or acts of willing) have their worth.  
Kant argues that moral respect attaches to the nature of decisions themselves, not to their 
actual results (the good will is good not because of what it achieves, but because of what it wills). 
This makes the agent who assesses themself morally in charge of their own self-respect in an 
important way: their self-respect cannot be withdrawn (on properly moral grounds) as a result 
merely of the world’s failure to cooperate. By contrast, self-conceit leads people to ground their 
self-respect in their happiness, assessing themselves on the basis of the prudential merit of their 
decisions. This kind of merit (and hence respect that is grounded in it) does require the world’s 
cooperation, since the worth of a prudential decision does depend upon its actual results. Hence, 
self-conceited respect cannot be guaranteed to an agent even if they fully commit to earning it. 
Although the self-conceited agent can comfort themself with the thought that their desires always 
merit fulfillment, they will not always think well of themself in comparison with others—
because they will not always be able to fulfill those desires. 
There are also further textual advantages to (Sensible)Self-Conceit. Recall that Kant 
claims that in self-love and self-conceit, our sensible self asserts itself “as if it constituted our 
entire self” (5:74; my section 4). This description implies that self-conceit is most fundamentally 
a misinterpretation by individuals of what they are and what kinds of things can be expected or 
required of them because of that. It is difficult to explain why a tendency to interpersonal 
arrogance would be based in the illusion that our sensibility is all we are. However, this 
description turns out to be particularly insightful if we understand self-conceit in the 
(Sensible)Self-Conceit way.  
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According to (Sensible)Self-Conceit, self-love turns into self-conceit when we take all of 
self-love’s advice about how to feel good and use it to set up a standard of assessment for 
ourselves. Under this description, self-conceit identifies self-love with the moral law, and thus 
identifies our inclinations with our rational and our moral capacities. It collapses what are in fact 
two different elements of our identity into one. Kant’s comment that self-conceit involves 
mistaking our sensible self for our “whole” self highlights this. It makes clear the primary reason 
why self-conceit is problematic for us: namely, that the standard of assessment it involves (which 
makes our value contingent on the inclinations we are able to satisfy for ourselves) is not 
appropriate for a being who is both sensible and rational.  
This collapse of the two aspects of ourselves is, in different senses, an underestimation 
and an overestimation of ourselves. It is an overestimation, as we have seen, in that it assumes 
our wants are angelic—always tracking the moral law. But it is also an underestimation, in that 
we fail to recognize that our sensible passivity is not the full story of who we are. Allowing our 
will to be determined by our inclinations amounts, according to Kant, to “heteronomy,” since our 
sensibility is always to some degree contingent and under the control of nature (5:43). By adding 
to this heteronomy, as we do when we are under the sway of self-conceit, the judgment that it is 
appropriate for us, we act as though we were less than the free beings we are. We ignore the fact 
that we have, as Kant puts it, a higher “vocation” than simply to satisfy our sensible desires 
(5:87), and a worth that is not contingent on the cooperation of nature. 
So (Sensible)Self-Conceit leads people to directly degrade both themselves and others. 
The self-conceited agent degrades all human beings by acting as though the only value humans 
have comes from their ability to realize their sensible desires. And their insistence that their 
sensible desires automatically align with the moral law also buys into the falsehood that it is not 
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good enough to be the kind of being who follows the moral law out of respect, under constraint. 
In self-conceit, humans seek to be the kind of spontaneously good creatures that they are not. 
Self-conceit, then, amounts to a deep kind of self-rejection: an unwillingness to accept that the 




Many have read self-conceit as it appears in Kant’s account of respect as primarily 
constituted by the failure to properly respect and take notice of others. However, this reading is 
in tension with Kant’s clear textual concerns about self-degradation, and the conception of 
immorality it gives overlooks important ways in which people can find it difficult to do what 
they ought. I have argued instead that self-conceit is a happiness-emphasizing conception of self, 
which overvalues the inclinations. When life goes well, this self-conception and the standard of 
assessment that it implies do lead to the opinion that one is worth more than others. When life 
goes badly, however, they lead to the opposite (and no less harmful) misunderstanding. Self-
conceit is prideful in that it treats what is in fact an amoral part of the human being (the sensible 
part) as though it were moral, using it to determine not only prudential advice, but also what the 
agent morally ought to do. It is self-shaming, however, in that it rejects the discipline-based form 
of value that humans can have according to Kant, and bases their worth on contingent facts about 
nature, fortune, and social success.  
The moral law corrects this misunderstanding by striking down the prideful aspect of 
self-conceit, revealing that our sensible nature has no guaranteed connection to the moral law. 
But it also uplifts us by reminding us that we are free rational beings, with a moral vocation and 
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a dignity within our control. The respect that these corrections call up in us has a profound and 
real effect on the way we treat others, if we understand the moral law properly. But first it affects 
us as individuals, driving us towards the revolution of self that must take place before any truly 
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It’s (Not) Complicated: Kant on Human Happiness and Competitiveness 




 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant writes that ‘all people 
have already, of themselves, the strongest and deepest inclination to happiness because it is just 
in this idea that all inclinations unite in one sum’ (4:399). One might be tempted to conclude on 
the basis of this reasoning that Kant’s approach to happiness is almost naively straight-forward. 
Of course human beings want happiness, he seems to say: happiness is precisely a collection of 
the things they want. To draw this conclusion, however, is to set oneself up for a surprise in the 
secondary literature. It is surprising, in particular, to come upon Allen Wood’s claim that 
according to Kant, ‘arrogance is originally the entire rationale for our desire for happiness… 
[and] the real point of being happy is to feed our insatiable amour propre’ (2001, 272).  
 According to Wood, this darker take on happiness must be Kant’s considered view: the 
view expressed in the Groundwork is not up to the task of explaining the other claims Kant 
makes about the matter. It cannot explain, especially, the cluster of traits that makes up a 
uniquely human competitiveness: human beings only consider themselves happy or unhappy 
based on how their own state compares to that of others, they care deeply about what others think 
of them, they are rarely if ever satisfied. These competitive details of human happiness make 
sense, it is alleged, only once we understand that for Kant, the human desire for happiness is 
rooted in a desire for superiority over others. 
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 This approach to Kant on happiness lends further support to a current trend in Kant 
scholarship, according to which Kant’s view is that arrogance is the central—and most 
problematic—feature of the human race, one which explains myriad anthropological and moral 
characteristics of the species.25 This trend is attractive in part because it helps Kant respond to a 
worry that commentators have had, in Kant’s time26 and more recently27. The worry is that Kant 
places morality and happiness in opposition for no good reason and that his account is needlessly 
austere. If Allen Wood and others are right, Kant has a great reason for thinking that morality 
and happiness are in some sense opposed to each other: our desire for happiness, influenced as it 
is by our membership in the human species, is actually an immoral, arrogant desire.  
 As it turns out, however, the quote with which we started is no aberration. Kant falls 
many times into the way of writing that on Wood’s view is an oversimplification, claiming or 
implying often that the desire to be happy follows easily from the fact that human beings are 
both limited and rational beings: ‘[t]o be happy is necessarily the demand of every rational but 
finite being’ (5:25); ‘The human being is a being with needs… and to this extent his reason 
                                                          
25 Allen Wood’s reading of human nature in Kant’s Ethical Thought was well-received (see Stephen Engstrom 
(2002), Sam Bruton (2001)). Henry Allison (2001) does criticize Wood’s equation of radical evil with unsociable 
sociability, but not his analysis of unsociable sociability and equation of it with arrogance. Sharon Anderson-Gold 
(2001) relatedly characterizes evil as arising from the predisposition to humanity—although she also admits, as I 
will assert here, that natural human competitiveness is not in itself immoral (61). Stephen Darwall (2008) places 
self-centered arrogance at the root of immorality on Kant’s account, referring explicitly to Wood’s influence. 
Stephen Engstrom (2010) and Andrews Reath (2006) adopt similar views of Kant on immorality.  
26 Friedrich Schiller expressed concerns that Kant’s ‘strict and harsh opposition of the two principles that have an 
effect on the human will’ would encourage ‘somber and monkish asceticism’ (2005, 150). Christian Garve accused 
Kant of holding that ‘[t]he virtuous person… strives unceasingly to be worthy of happiness but never, insofar as he 
is truly virtuous, to be happy’ (Kant quoting Garve, 8:281). Hegel also criticized the relationship Kant set up 
between the desires of individuals and their moral duty, writing that Kant’s theory ‘produces a view of morality as 
nothing but a bitter, unending, struggle against self-satisfaction’ (1967, 84). 
27 Victoria S. Wike (1994) notes that the unnecessarily austere Kant often shows up in introductory text-books (see 
xvii). In Susan Wolf’s (1982) characterization of the Kantian (‘Rational’) Saint, she raises the concern that the ideal 
Kantian, who may suffer from ‘a pathological fear of damnation… or an extreme form of self-hatred that interferes 
with his ability to enjoy the enjoyable life’ (424). Rae Langton (1992, 485) also raises the concern that Kant’s 
theory, by neglecting the importance of inclination, sets up a model for human action that leads to a life devoid of 
meaning and joy. Paul Formosa (2010) refers to the reading of Kant on which his theory promotes a battle to 
‘subdue or even eliminate’ the inclinations (which make up our happiness) as a ‘still common caricature’ (1).   
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certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility… to form practical maxims with a 
view to happiness…’ (5:61); the human being cannot renounce happiness ‘just as no finite 
rational being whatever can’ (8:278).  
 I will argue that there is nothing mysterious going on here: Kant really did hold that 
human beings pursue happiness because they are interested in satisfying their inclinations.28 
There certainly have been and continue to be philosophers who understand Kant’s theory of 
human happiness as more straight-forwardly hedonistic at its roots.29 However, although 
proponents of this reading of Kant have taken up the coherence of Kant’s theory of happiness on 
a number of counts,30 there has not been an attempt to reconcile it specifically with human 
competitiveness. Without such a defense, it would seem that while a thorough-goingly desire-
satisfaction reading of Kant’s theory of happiness can overcome other internal problems, it 
cannot be squared with his larger anthropological picture of human beings. 
 My task here will be to tie up this loose end. I will demonstrate how, together with Kant’s 
theory of rationality, his seemingly rudimentary view of our desire for happiness provides 
sufficient underpinning for the competitive details he includes in his theory of happiness. My 
argument is broken into five sections. In the first section, I present two accounts of Kant on 
happiness: Allen Wood’s and the more thorough-goingly hedonistic alternative, which I term the 
Satisfaction Account. In sections two and three, I explain how two of the complications in Kant’s 
theory of happiness—that human happiness is comparative, and that its achievement is hampered 
                                                          
28 Other commentators have debated whether Kant’s definition of happiness involves the satisfaction of all 
inclinations or the satisfaction of a systemized selection of them (See Gary Watson (1983),. I will be proceeding 
under the assumption that the latter is correct, but I will not be arguing for that view and do not think anything I say 
substantially depends on it. 
29 Mary Gregor (1963), Gary Watson (1983), Victoria S. Wike (1994), Alice Pinheiro Walla (2015), among others. 
30 Commentators have debated the definition of happiness for Kant, for instance (Victoria Wike (1987), Watson 
(1983)), how Kant’s conception of happiness fits with his doctrine of the highest good (Gregor (1963), Guyer 
(2000)), whether or in what sense prudential rationality requires that we pursue happiness (Pinheiro Wall (2015), 
Allison Hills (2009), Barbara Herman (2007)—I draw on commentators from this last category in section 4). 
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by human unsociable sociability—can be explained on the Satisfaction Account. In section four, 
I respond to the concern that if Kant’s view is the Satisfaction Account, he has no explanation for 
the fact that human beings form an ideal of happiness instead of simply pursuing all and only the 
inclinations that come along in the moment. In section five, I explain what my own reading of 
Kant on happiness allows to be said about Kant’s insistence that there is something morally 
problematic about the way human beings pursue happiness.  
 
1. The Accounts 
 
 In the conclusion of Kant’s Ethical Thought, Allen Wood sums up his reading of Kant on 
human beings by noting that ‘Kant understands virtually everything in human life as an 
expression of unsociable sociability, self-conceit, or the radical propensity to evil in human 
nature (three names for the same reality)’ (1999, 334). Looking elsewhere, we find that these 
‘three names for the same reality’ all come down to arrogance. Unsociable sociability is, 
according to Wood, ‘the desire for superiority [which] requires others (over whom to feel 
superior)’ (2009, 116), self-conceit is ‘the false and radically corrupt notion that I am worth more 
than others and that confirming my self-worth involves gaining… superiority’ (2001, 276), and 
radical evil is ‘prideful self-assertion… against the dignity of rational nature in the person of 
other human beings’ (1999, 291). Indeed, we are told quite plainly that for Kant, ‘ambition is the 
root of all evil’ (1999, 290).  
 Here, my focus will not be on Wood’s reading of Kant on immorality (which is most 
directly focused on self-conceit and radical evil), but on his related reading of Kant on human 
happiness, which I call the Arrogance Account: 
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Arrogance Account: [It is not the case that] arrogance is merely one possible side-
effect of thinking oneself happy… [Rather,] arrogance is originally the entire 
rationale for our desire for happiness. In other words, it is our overriding need to 
confirm our self-conceit that makes us lay claim to happiness as a mark of superiority 
over others…. The real point of being happy is to feed our insatiable amour propre. 
(2001, 272) 
 
Two claims are attributed to Kant, here. The first claim is that at the most basic level, human 
beings pursue happiness not because achieving happiness would give them satisfaction, but 
because they see it as a way of establishing superiority.31 According to this view, human beings 
have a basic desire to be better than others, and our interest in happiness is spurred and shaped 
most fundamentally by this desire. As Wood puts it elsewhere, ‘the original point of considering 
ourselves to be happy is that we want to think of ourselves as better than others’ (1996, 146). 
The second claim Wood attributes to Kant is the claim that human beings believe they already 
are, in some sense, superior to others.32 The belief that we deserve superiority partially explains 
our craving for it.  
In contrast, I argue Kant held that our pursuit of happiness originates in a desire to 
experience the agreeable. On this account, our interest in superiority is secondary to that more 
innocent primary interest. In other words I hold the following: 
Satisfaction Account: According to Kant, human beings are interested in happiness 
because they are interested in satisfying their inclinations. Superiority becomes a 
particular object of fixation for some of them only because they overvalue happiness, 
and many see superiority as an especially helpful tool for achieving it.33   
 
                                                          
31 According to Wood, this motivation comes into play only with regard to happiness, which unites our inclinations 
into a coherent whole. It is the pursuit of this idea that is to be explained by the desire to be better than others, not 
the pursuit of any particular object. The latter can be explained more simply, in terms of a kind of hedonism (see 
2001, 266-271). 
32 Wood’s definition of ambition according to Kant (1999, 263), together with his claim that ambition is the root of 
all human immorality, also confirms that this is one of the elements of his account. 
33 This account is deliberately worded (as is the Arrrogance Account) to capture the fact that these accounts are 
explicitly about the underlying human desire for happiness, not about the definition of happiness. 
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Nonetheless, some of Kant’s key doctrines regarding happiness imply that humans are 
competitive in how they chase after and conceive of their happiness. I will explain how Kant 
arrives at these doctrines without making use of the Arrogance Account. The first doctrine I will 
turn to is Kant’s definition of the predisposition to humanity and his insistence that this 
predisposition is intimately connected with a tendency to compare oneself to others and to worry 
about their opinions. 
 
2. The Human Preoccupation with Comparison  
 
One Kantian doctrine that ascribes a competitive tendency to human beings is Kant’s 
definition of our predisposition to ‘humanity.’ This predisposition is one of three—to animality, 
to humanity, and to personality—that Kant lists in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 
describing them as ‘those [predispositions] that relate immediately to the faculty of desire and 
the exercise of the power of choice’ (6:28).34 According to Kant: 
The predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love 
which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is, 
only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy. (6:27) 
 
Wood claims that the fact that our happiness takes this comparative form reveals that our interest 
in happiness is actually an interest in being better off than others (see 2001, Section 5). 
When Kant introduces the predisposition to humanity, he notes that while our desire for 
the form of happiness it describes does produce ‘the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of 
                                                          
34 These are not the only predispositions that Kant thinks are relevant to human nature. He also writes elsewhere that 
the human animal is distinguished from other animals by virtue of the ‘technical,’ ‘pragmatic,’ and ‘moral 
predispositions’ (7:322-325). Wilson (2006) argues that this list overlaps with Kant’s list in the Religion, the 
‘pragmatic’ predisposition being the same as the predisposition to ‘humanity,’ and the ‘technical’ predisposition 
being left out of the Religion list because it is not relevant to the goodness or evil of the species. 
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others,’ that inclination leads us to seek ‘merely equal worth: not allowing anyone superiority 
over oneself’ (6:27). Our desire for equality, however, is ‘bound up with the constant anxiety that 
others might be striving for ascendency,’ and ‘from this [anxiety] arises gradually an unjust 
desire to acquire superiority… for the sake of security, as a preventive measure’ (ibid). 
According to this text, our more basic desire is only the desire to be (and be seen as) the equal of 
other human beings. This is not an arrogant or morally problematic desire. We are the equals of 
others. It is our fear that others will attempt to frustrate this reasonable desire for equality that 
leads us to desire (preventative) superiority.35  
In Kant’s immediate discussion of the predisposition to humanity, he does not suggest 
that arrogance or the desire for superiority are the source of our tendency to make use of 
comparison in our pursuit of happiness. Rather, the former follows from the latter. This means 
that the text we have examined so far does not explicitly support the Arrogance Account over the 
Satisfaction Account. Still, it does indicate that human beings will be unable to experience 
happiness if they are surrounded by others who think little of them or are better off than they are. 
The explanation of this trait is obvious on the Arrogance Account. If happiness is something we 
desire under the guise of superiority over others, these conditions will directly contribute to the 
conclusion that we have not achieved happiness. I will show, however, that Kant does not 
explain the trait this way. First, I will explain why, on Kant’s view, people care about how the 
state of others compares to their own. Then, I will explain why, in light of this, they also care 
about the opinions others have of them. 
 
                                                          
35 In his argument that the love of honor is morally valuable (not morally problematic) in Kant’s moral system, 
Rudolph Makkreel (2012) asserts that the vices associated with the desire for superiority attach themselves to us ‘as 
reactions to the attempt by others to gain a superiority over us’ (107). 
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2.1 Why Comparing States Matters to Us 
 The Arrogance Account attributes to Kant the thesis that we want to be better than others 
partially because we think we deserve this. Wood argues that Kant needs this thesis in order to 
explain why human beings compare themselves with others. It is not that Wood thinks it strange 
that human beings use comparison at all. Rather, it is the fact that they tend to direct their 
comparative powers at other human beings that is remarkable. Wood writes that although there is 
indeed a basic sense in which humans use comparison, ‘Kant thinks that as ‘humanity’… is 
found in the members of our rational species… it also essentially involves comparisons of 
different kind’ (1996, 146)—that is, comparison of the sort that ‘involves comparing ourselves 
with other people’ (ibid). Wood’s explanation of how we come to compare ourselves with other 
human beings begins with Kant’s retelling of the Biblical story of the Garden of Eden in 
Conjectural Beginning of Human History.  
 In this text, Kant frames comparison as vital to the (metaphorical) first exercise of reason 
in human beings. The ‘voice of God’ in the Biblical story represents, in Kant’s version, the 
natural instincts of the original human animals (8:111). And the moral of the story, in which the 
first people disobey God, is that ‘it is a peculiarity of reason that, aided by imagination, it can 
invent desires not only without a corresponding natural urge, but even contrary to it’ (ibid). 
Reason manufactures such desires by allowing humans to compare instinctively desired things to 
other objects, extending their desire to these new things. The question Wood raises is how the 
tendency to make these sorts of comparisons could have developed into a tendency to compare 
one’s state with the state of others.  
 As Wood understands it, this further tendency began with human beings’ realization that 
their ability to transform their desires made them superior to non-rational animals. Kant writes 
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that after human beings realized this ability within themselves they were ‘completely 
raised…above [their] society with animals’ (8:114). At this point, the paradigm human being of 
Kant’s story ‘no longer viewed [non-rational animals] as his fellows in creation, but rather as 
means at his will’s disposal and as tools for attaining any chosen ends’ (ibid). So, human beings 
came to understand themselves both as valuable and as higher in value than non-rational 
animals. According to Wood, this simultaneous realization of self-worth and of higher worth is, 
in Kant’s opinion, the basis for a tendency to look at others when assessing our value:  
When the human being thinks of his dignity… by contrasting himself with the other 
animals, he expresses it in a comparative judgment, asserting the superiority of his 
natural being over that of brutes…. This prepares the way for the self-conceited 
assertion of his natural superiority over other rational beings….’ (1999, 241) 
  
 Wood’s reading of the human transition from innocent rational comparison to a morally 
problematic tendency to compare oneself with others is a rational reconstruction: In the 
Conjectural Beginning of Human History, Kant does not tell us this is what happens. He does not 
note any tendency for human beings to infer falsely that their new-found superiority extends over 
other human beings. In fact, he notes exactly the opposite: when human beings realize their 
superiority over animals in Kant’s story, this ‘also implies (however vaguely) the thought… that 
[they] may not [think thusly of] another human being but should rather regard the latter as an 
equal recipient of the gifts of nature’ (8:114). Human beings realize their equality with all 
rational beings (including other human beings) and their superiority over non-rational ones 
simultaneously. 
 Why, then, does our predisposition to humanity include a tendency to compare our states 
with the states of others? Here, it will be helpful to return to Kant’s discussion of rational 
comparisons in the Garden of Eden. Kant writes of the mythological occasion upon which 
human beings first used comparison to break free from nature:  
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Perhaps it was only a fruit, the sight of which invited him, through its similarity with 
other agreeable fruits that he had already tasted, to experiment. Or perhaps an animal 
whose nature was fit for the consumption of the fruit also provided an example for 
him, on whom, however, such consumption had an opposite, harmful effect, and was 
consequently resisted by a natural instinct in him. (8:112)  
 
In this passage, Kant describes two ways rational comparison can create new desires. We can 
become attracted to a new, instinctively neutral, object because that object resemble other objects 
that instinct does recommend (the fruit on the forbidden tree looks like the fruit on other, not 
forbidden, trees). We can also become attracted to a new object, however, by observing that it is 
being enjoyed by another being who resembles us in some way (snakes are animals, too).  
Other human beings do resemble us. When we see them enjoying anything at all, we have 
some grounds to be curious about how that object might benefit us: a new desire is produced to 
have the object, or something like it, ourselves. On this basis, we tend to alter our conception of 
happiness such that it calls for the acquisition of the things we see our neighbors enjoying.36 On 
Kant’s view, the ideal of happiness presents for us ‘the state of a rational being in the world in 
the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will’ (5:124). In 
focusing on achieving happiness, we do not merely focus on getting most of the things that we 
have added into our conception of happiness, but all of them.37 
The pressure to aspire to achieve what others already have is only greater given our 
ignorance about what will please us. As Kant puts it:  
Only experience can teach what brings us joy. Only the natural drives… can tell each 
of us, and each only in his particular way, in what he will find those joys; and, in the 
same way, only experience can teach him the means by which to seek them. (6:215) 38  
 
                                                          
36 I say “tend to” because we can imagine a case in which we decide that the cost of this extra pleasure is not worth 
it to us because of some predictable loss in satisfaction we would suffer for it. 
37 Sonia Sikka (2007) emphasizes the fact that, for Kant, happiness consists primarily in feeling the lack of what one 
does not yet have, instead of in contented focus on what one has achieved, when she contrasts Kant’s view with that 
of his student Gottfried Herder (see especially 519-521). 
38 See also 5:25-26, 36, and 4:395-396, 417-418. 
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Facts about the things that will make us happy are empirical and individually variable, and we 
are liable to make mistakes about them. In such circumstances, looking at what has worked for 
our neighbors is a sensible strategy.  
 Kant’s retelling of the story of Eden is part of a larger narrative in which he describes the 
migration of people into cities by reference to just this tendency to want what we see other 
people enjoying. As he tells it, shortly after agriculture made possible the formation of some 
small centers of society, shepherds were also enticed to settle down in agricultural towns because 
of the goods and experiences being enjoyed by those who lived in the cities:  
[I]n time the increasing luxury of the town dwellers, above all, however, the art of 
pleasing, a matter in which women from the towns far surpassed the unkempt girls of 
desert, must have been a tremendous attraction for the herdsmen to enter into 
relations with the former and let themselves be taken in to the glittering misery of the 
towns. (8:120) 
 
Kant sees no need, in getting this explanation off the ground, to suppose that the herdsmen think 
that they are more deserving of high quality ‘pleasing’ than the town dwellers. 
 The catalyst of the transition from comparing objects to comparing states is simply 
reason itself, given the circumstances that the reasoner is a human being surrounded by other 
human beings. No further assumptions, in particular no assumptions about a desire to confirm 
our superiority, are required.  
 
2.2 Why the Opinions of Others Matter to Us 
So far, it is clear why happiness would involve interpersonal comparisons even on the 
Satisfaction Account. Kant’s description of the capacity to extend desires by means of 
comparison makes it clear that comparison with other human beings would be a result of even 
this basic function. But Kant also claims that ‘[o]ut of this [comparative] self-love originates the 
             57 
 
inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others’ (6:27). The next thing to explain, then, is how 
the tendency to compare could lead us to care about what others think of us.  
On Wood’s account, we come to care about the opinions of others because we desire to 
be worth more than they are. Since all rational beings are equal, there is no way for us to actually 
become worth more than them. The best we can do to approximate actual superiority is to get 
others to falsely believe we are superior (1999, 263). The opinions of others, then, are valuable to 
us particularly because opinions can be wrong and so can be used to lend seeming support to our 
delusions of grandeur. 
One problem with this explanation of Kant’s text is that it does not seem true to his claim 
that most fundamentally, our predisposition to humanity only leads us to desire that others not 
think poorly of us (6:27). Wood’s account moves too quickly from the human desire to ‘gain 
worth’ in the opinions of others to the distinct desire to gain a higher worth than we deserve in 
the opinions of others. According to Kant, this latter desire can arise from our fear that others 
will attempt to deny us equal worth, but it is not an immediate part of our concern with opinion.  
Another worry about Wood’s reading is this: Kant claims that our inclination to gain 
worth in the opinion of others arises from our tendency to judge ourselves happy or not based on 
whether our condition compares well or poorly with the conditions of others. He does not say 
that this concern comes directly from our tendency to judge ourselves valuable or not based on 
comparison, as Wood’s reading requires. Relatedly, our concern with the opinions of others, on 
Wood’s account, arises in the context of a previously existing desire for superiority, whereas for 
Kant, the opinions of others are of concern to us independently of any such ambition, on the 
basis of our desire for (comparatively informed) happiness alone.  
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On Kant’s picture, there are two things that can better explain why the desire for 
happiness leads to concern about the opinions of others, neither or which implies a need for the 
Arrogance Account: our dependence upon others instrumentally and our desire for relationships 
with them.  
The good opinion of others is instrumentally valuable to us in several ways. We have 
seen that our satisfaction with what we have requires that we not be surrounded by others who 
are enjoying things we lack. If people believe we are inferior to them, though, they are less likely 
to be uncomfortable with inequalities. This will make attempts to remove inequality more 
difficult. If others favor us, on the other hand, their good opinion can lead them to want to help 
us, both in our pursuit of greater social equality and in our endeavors more generally. As long as 
we have difficult-to-reach goals, then, we have reason to care about others’ opinions. Given that 
we construct our idea of happiness comparatively, what we want is often exactly what others 
have and know how to acquire. This only makes it clearer why the opinions of others should 
matter to us.  
The good opinions of others are also essential for good relationships with them, which 
Kant acknowledges we need. Despite their unsociable characteristics, he claims, ‘[t]he human 
being is a being meant for society’ (6:471). The drive to be in the company of others is so basic 
that Kant includes it as a component of our mechanical and merely animal self-love (6:26), and 
he goes so far as to claim that without friendship, human beings feel ‘completely alone with 
[their] thoughts, as in a prison’ (6:472). One of the important elements of any human conception 
of happiness is community and friendship. If we are to fully share ourselves and our lives with 
others, we cannot allow them to come to dislike us or to believe that we are inferior. Our deeply 
ingrained desire for relationships with others, along with our clear dependence on their aid in 
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achieving happiness more generally, is sufficient to explain how human happiness becomes 
entangled with concerns about what others think. 
 
3. Unsociable Sociability and the Endlessness of the Search for Happiness  
 
So far, I have explained how, even if Kant holds the Satisfaction Account, he can still 
explain why human happiness takes the comparison-based form outlined in the predisposition to 
humanity and why human beings care so much about the opinions of others. However, another 
place in which Kant’s commitment to human competitiveness is evident is in his claim that 
people are ‘unsociably social.’ According to Kant, nature spurs the development of human 
capacities with this characteristic:  
The means that nature employs in order to bring about the development of all of the 
predispositions of humans is their antagonism in society…. Here I take antagonism to 
mean the unsociable sociability of human beings, that is, their tendency to enter into 
society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant resistance that continually 
threatens to tear up this society. (8:20)  
 
 Kant’s claim that human beings are unsociably social seems to speak in favor of the 
Arrogance Account because anyone who prefers to be around others only in order to be superior 
to them obviously fits the description ‘unsociably social.’ 39 This reading of unsociable 
sociability also explains how our unsociable sociability makes us unlikely to achieve happiness, 
condemning us to continuously chase it, instead. Because we are unsociably social, so the 
Arrogance Account claims, we tend to pursue whatever will make us seem superior. However, in 
order to actually be happy, we must experience pleasure or contentment. These two things do not 
automatically line up, Wood explains, and the difference between them ‘opens up the possibility 
                                                          
39 Wood explicitly characterizes unsociable sociability in this way. See 2009, 116 (also 1999, 286 and 2001, 272). 
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that even if we achieved what is represented in [our] idea [of happiness], we would still not be 
happy’ (1996, 147). 
 The first question is what the Satisfaction Account can say about Kant’s claim that 
human beings are unsociably sociable. Kant describes the ‘sociablility’ part of this tendency as 
follows: ‘Human beings have an inclination to associate with one another because in such a 
condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is to say, more in a position to develop 
their natural predispositions’ (8:20-1). According to Kant, when we are by ourselves, we are less 
likely to achieve the ends that are most important to us. We need the support of others in order to 
have the time and tools to complete the sorts of activities that make us feel like the rational 
beings we are. 
 Human unsociability, on the other hand, is the following tendency:  
[Human beings] also have a strong tendency to isolate themselves, because they 
encounter in themselves the unsociable trait that predisposes them to want to direct 
everything only to their own ends and hence to expect to encounter resistance 
everywhere, just as they know they tend to resist others. (8:21)  
 
Many commentators associate unsociable sociability with immorality,40 and this association is 
natural partially because of the ‘unsocial’ part of this characteristic. It is natural to think that our 
moral character is evidenced by our social movement toward others and our immoral tendencies 
by our antisocial resistance to them,41 and hence that, as Wood claims ‘the content of the [moral] 
                                                          
40 Chad Wellmon follows Wood in referring to the unsociable sociability of human beings as a ‘social malformation 
of human nature’, in which our inclinations ‘become evil’ (2009, 564). Jeanine Grenberg, who disagrees with the 
claim that unsociable sociability is the ‘source’ of radical evil, still holds that it is ‘the ultimate expression’ of it 
(2010, 39), and Pablo Muchnik characterizes unsociable sociability as an expression of evil, although he denies that 
it has its source in culture (2009, xiii-xv). J.B. Schneewind (2009) describes specifically the unsociable part of 
human nature as evil. Barbara Herman (2009) does not call unsociable sociability evil, attributing it to moral 
immaturity, but she also writes that human beings ‘cannot live without each other (if only to have someone to 
dominate)’ (157). In her review of Muchnik’s Kant’s Theory of Evil (2009), Holly L. Wilson concludes, following 
the general trend I am describing here, that ‘[a]lthough the natural predispositions are toward the good, they are 
characterized in their details by the principle of unsociable sociability, and this principle could still be the sufficient 
grounding for Kant’s belief in the radical propensity for evil’ (2012, 463). 
41 As J.B. Schneewind notes (2009, 110), many of Kant’s contemporaries thought this way, although not all of 
them—Thomas Hobbes is one exception (see also The Leviathan, chapter 8). 
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law [is] directly opposed to all the natural-social tendencies present in our unsociable sociability’ 
(2009, 120). However, this intuitive idea is not borne out by Kant’s moral theory more generally. 
Kant claims that ‘[t]he principle of mutual love admonishes [human beings] constantly to come 
closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance 
from one another’ (6:449). Acting morally well, for Kant, is not only a matter of learning to 
come closer to and care for others—it is also a matter of learning to stay back.42 The fact that our 
unsociability tends to push us away from others, then, is not good evidence that Kant connects it 
especially to our immorality.  
The more pointed question relevant to whether or not Kant’s doctrine of unsociable 
sociability supports the Arrogance Account, however, is whether our unsociable sociability 
manifests specifically a tendency to arrogance. But our unsociability is not a desire (or 
manifestation of the desire) for superiority. It is a stubborn desire for happiness. In Kant’s 
description of unsociability, he claims that each of us desires the realization of our own uniquely 
chosen ends. We want to pursue our happiness, conceived of in our own private way. However, 
that means getting others to help us. In societies, in which we have to work together with others 
who have their own wills and desires, sacrificing and delaying our own projects is sometimes 
necessary. We have a natural resistance to this, which Kant calls our ‘unsociability,’ but that 
resistance in itself is not inappropriate. Kant is clear that ‘no one else has a right to require of me 
that I sacrifice my ends if these are not immoral’ (6:388). Unsociability is problematic if one 
allows it to fully dictate one’s actions without further assessment, but that is true of all human 
                                                          
42 Susan Shell (2009) argues that similarly, the ideal state of nature for Kant ‘depicts a condition in which the social 
forces of attraction and repulsion stand in perfect equilibrium’ (55)—not a condition in which repulsion has finally 
been eliminated. 
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inclination for Kant—to think otherwise would be to think human sensibility is naturally moral, 
which Kant explicitly denies. 
Another fact about human beings that makes them unsociable, aside from their 
determination to achieve their own happiness, is the fact that they are resistant to the hard work 
that building a society requires. Kant asserts that being in society makes human beings unhappy 
partially because of society’s failure to satisfy their pleasure-driven animal nature. Society 
requires each human being to ‘cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to moralize himself by 
means of the arts and sciences,’ when he would rather ‘give himself over passively to the 
impulses of ease and good living, which he calls happiness43’ (7:324-325). And the human step 
out of the state of nature is ‘perilous,’ according to Kant, in the following sense: 
[I]t drove [the human being] from the harmless and secure condition of childcare… 
that took care of him without any effort from him and thrust him into the wide 
world…. From this moment on the arduousness of life will bring him the wish for 
paradise, a creation of his imagination where he might rest in calm inactivity and 
perpetual peace and dream and fritter away his existence. (8:114)  
 
Chasing after happiness in society is ‘arduous,’ and we do not enjoy having to do it. The human 
being Kant describes here reacts to this condition by retreating into ‘a creation of his 
imagination’ in which no effort need be put into his own satisfaction, in which he needs no one 
and no one needs him: he dreams, essentially, of being completely unsocially happy.  
Unsociability is not immoral arrogance—it is simply the tendency not to want to be 
involved in those aspects of society that are genuinely and understandably unpleasant for us. I do 
not mean to deny, however, that Kant thinks humans do sometimes come to desire superiority 
over others. Kant does sometimes note that human beings can come to want domination over 
others:  
                                                          
43 This is admittedly an idealistic, dreamy version of happiness, not a real possibility. If we attempted to give 
ourselves ‘passively over’ to some of our goals (career goals, for instance), we would fail to achieve them. 
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In a civil constitution… animality still manifests itself earlier and, at bottom, more 
powerfully than pure humanity…. The human being’s self-will is always ready to 
break out in aversion toward his neighbor, and he always presses his claim to 
unconditional freedom; freedom not merely to be independent of others, but even to 
be master over other beings who by nature are equal to him….’ (7:327) 
 
However, this desire for unconditional freedom in the form of mastery over others can only be a 
result of our desire for happiness. It is not something that precedes and shapes that desire, as the 
Arrogance Account requires.  
 Kant cannot be referring to a desire for superiority for its own sake in this quote because 
he claims here that the tendency to try to dominate people comes about due to human ‘animality’ 
continuously reemerging in human interaction. But human animality is ‘physical or merely 
mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not required’ (6:26). As we saw earlier, the 
tendency to care about comparison is not, strictly speaking, even a component of human 
animality—it a component of humanity, in which animality and reason are intermixed. To take 
the quote above as a reference to the human desire for superiority as such would be to confuse a 
physical, animal drive, with a much more elaborately social one.44 
 We also have direct evidence that Kant thought human beings tend to value positions of 
power over others instrumentally, as a way to acquire more means for achieving their 
happiness—not in a basic way that informs their original understanding of happiness itself. After 
comparing human societies to bee hives, Kant writes: 
But many such hives next to each other will soon attack each other like robber bees 
(war); not, however, as human beings do, in order to strengthen their own group by 
uniting with others—for here the comparison ends—but only to use by cunning or 
force others’ industry for themselves. Each people seeks to strengthen itself through 
the subjugation of neighboring peoples, either from the desire to expand or the fear of 
being swallowed up by the other unless one beats him to it. (7:330) 
                                                          
44 This is a general problem for Wood’s account. In other passages as well, Kant refers to the part of human beings 
that is resistant to society as the ‘animal’ part of them (7:325, 327). Wood’s reading, however, ties our unsociability 
closely to the predisposition to humanity and its comparative nature as he understands it—not to our predisposition 
to animality. (See for example Wood, 2010, 152; 2009, 115; 1999, 288.) 
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The people of each culture desire to be powerful enough to achieve their goals, and this desire is 
the primary force behind their tendency to war. Groups dominate each other not because they 
enjoy finding themselves superior but because domination amounts to security and broader 
possibilities. Superiority over others can be a valuable instrumental good, even to an agent whose 
sights are set on nothing more illicit than the realization of their own conception of happiness. If 
I have power over others, I can force them to do what I want or inspire the kind of admiration 
that will make them want to do it, simply to please me.  
 Although nature’s aim in instilling human beings with unsociable sociability is to create 
competition, it does not achieve this end by directly instilling a desire to dominate others. Rather, 
it gives human beings the desire for a completely independent, unobstructed, and relaxing 
achievement of happiness while at the same time making them beings for whom this is 
impossible. This brings me to the second point about unsociable sociability on the Satisfaction 
Account. I have said that the Arrogance Account’s reading of unsociable sociability helps 
explain Kant’s claim that unsociable sociability spurs human beings to realize their potential by 
making them unhappy. This claim still comes out true on the Satisfaction Account. Even on the 
Satisfaction Account’s version of unsociable sociability, human beings have two conflicting 
characteristics: we want to freely and easily achieve happiness, but the achievement of 
happiness, for us, invariably depends upon the help of other free beings. On my reading of 
unsociable sociability, then, this trait still helps to explain our tendency to be dissatisfied. 
 In sum, unsociable sociability is a way of being unhappy, not a way of being immoral. 
The fact that human beings are the kinds of beings who must balance a desire to be effortlessly 
happy with a desire for harmony with others does lead us to some moral conclusions about them. 
For example, when being like this prioritize happiness over morality, they can be expected by to 
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try to control and manipulate people in morally suspect ways, instead of simply abandoning all 
others. But being unsociably social is not identical to making this moral mistake or even a result 
of having made it, and it does not reveal any innate tendency toward arrogance in the human race 
as a whole.  
 
4. Why Bother Bringing Inclinations ‘Into a Tolerable System’? 
 
So far, I have argued that on Kant’s theory of human nature, human beings would 
predictably be competitive even though they are motivated to pursue happiness solely because of 
the perceived agreeableness of its contents. I have argued that the capacity for rational 
comparison leads human beings to look for more objects to include in their conceptions of 
happiness, and that their closeness and similarity to other human beings will lead them to look 
particularly to what their neighbors have in doing this. I have further argued that human 
dependence on others draws human beings into the game of trying to win the good opinion of 
others, even if they are not arrogant, and that they both need and resent having to live and work 
with others to pursue happiness.  
According to Wood, however, this account would be an over-simplification. In fact, he 
argues that Kant needs to attribute arrogance to human beings in order to explain why they 
pursue ‘happiness’ at all, instead of pursuing nothing over and above each object of inclination 
as it comes along. As Wood puts it: 
[T]he apparently innocent step of introducing an ‘idea’ of happiness actually involves 
Kant in a fundamentally new conception of happiness that is not at all the same as 
pleasure, contentment, or desire-satisfaction, and is quite incompatible with the desire 
for happiness arising merely from our animal nature… (2001, 269). 
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Wood is right that it would be too quick to leap directly from merely animal needs and desires to 
the conclusion that human beings are interested in pursuing happiness. Kant is clear that it is the 
rational animal in particular who pursues happiness. 
 But Wood does not merely claim that reason is required in order to explain the 
construction of conceptions of happiness. Rather, he thinks that reason and the desire for 
superiority are needed to explain this construction. According to Wood, Kant’s answer to the 
question ‘Why do human beings pursue happiness?’: 
locates the original motivation in human nature for the idea of happiness not in our 
natural but in our social condition, and the social meaning of our natural desires. We 
consider ourselves happy as a way of thinking of ourselves as better off than other 
people…. (271).  
 
As Wood explains it, we think in terms of an ideal because an ideal is something we can 
compare with the achievements of others, the acquisition of which we can boast about. 
But flaunting happiness is not be the only, or the most promising, option for claiming 
superiority. I could conceive of myself as better than others simply by believing that my 
particular hair color made me the ideal of the human form, or by discounting all negative 
opinions about myself. Historical examples, from attempted justifications of American slavery to 
the ideological underpinning for Nazism, confirm that people in fact find this method quite 
appealing. And we have already seen how difficult it is for people to discover and achieve what 
will make them happy. It would be safer to believe that one’s more stable characteristics are the 
source of one’s superiority. It is true that these methods involve adopting false beliefs, but the 
belief that happiness can make me superior to others is also a false belief, according to Kant. 
More importantly, Wood’s claim that the pursuit of the ideal of happiness must have a very 
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different motivation than the less systematic pursuit of inclination does not align with Kant’s 
texts.45  
Kant explains our desire for happiness simply: ‘people have already, of themselves, the 
strongest and deepest inclination to happiness because it is just in this idea that all inclinations 
unite in one sum’ (4:399). Here, Kant insists that human beings desire happiness because 
happiness is a collection of many things they desire individually. Further, Kant claims that all 
finite rational beings (not just prideful human ones) pursue happiness.46 He also comments that 
morality cannot require human beings to renounce their happiness, ‘for that is something [they] 
cannot do, just as no finite rational being whatever can’ (8:278), and often refers to happiness as 
though it were attractive to us in the same way the objects of our inclinations are attractive to us: 
as an object of pleasure. Kant writes that ‘[t]he principle of one’s own happiness… contains no 
determining ground for the will other than such as is suitable to the lower faculty of desire,’ 
where the lower faculty of desire is moved in particular by sensible incentives—that is, the 
perception that something is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses (5:24). He also writes that 
empiricism, which places happiness as the determinant of the moral law, is dangerously 
attractive to human beings precisely because it is ‘allied with all the inclinations, which [are]… 
so favorable to everyone’s way of feeling’ (5:71), not because it dangles before them the 
possibility of their being superior to others. And finally, Kant defines the principle of happiness 
as ‘each choosing as he please[s] according to his inclination’ (5:126). 47 
Human beings want happiness, according to Kant, because they want its pleasant 
contents. And this straight-forward view is not so implausible, given Kant’s theory of rationality. 
                                                          
45 Wood (1996, 145) does admit that there is a conflict, but it is more pervasive than he acknowledges. 
46 See also 4:415, 416; 5:25, 61. 
47 Kant also writes that the ‘counterweight’ to morality in each human being’s experience is made up of ‘his needs 
and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness’ (4:405). 
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For Kant, the fact that human beings are rational beings with wills means they have the capacity 
to ‘act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles’ 
(4:412). This yields a connection between the desire to pursue any one object of inclination and a 
tendency to adopt a rule (or principle for action) according to which those things that satisfy 
inclination should be looked after in general: in other words, a rule to pursue happiness. Alison 
Hills (2009) explains the connection:  
[I]f you regard yourself as having reason to satisfy a desire, you should acknowledge 
that other desires, both now and in the future, have some normative claim on you as 
well. You should try not to pursue your current desires in such a way that this rules 
out satisfying the desire that you think that you will have in the future. (41) 
 
Hills argues that reason requires our pursuit of happiness because it demands that, in claiming 
that any one desire provides us with a reason to pursue the object of that desire, we admit that 
desires in general are the sorts of things that might provide us with reasons. This, by itself, 
prudentially pressures us to focus on happiness as a whole, instead of on each desire as it comes 
along. 
Barbara Herman (2007) describes a further dimension of the capacity to reason that 
connects the pursuit of particular objects with the pursuit of happiness. In addition to making us 
think in principled ways, rationality also makes us think about the future:  
Because we are rational and possess imagination, we not only can conceive of doing 
and feeling otherwise than we do, we recognize that we have a future whose shape we 
are able to affect. We come to have the concept of our life, something we can foresee 
will go along and be pleasurable, or not, depending (partly) on the wisdom of our 
choices. (182) 
 
Our capacity to reason opens a point of view for us that reveals our existence across time, instead 
of only in the moment. This complicates the picture enough for us that our pursuit of the sensibly 
satisfying can no longer get along without a conception of happiness.  
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 We cannot help but realize that our desires are changeable and potentially in conflict with 
each other in the long-run. The only way to mitigate this is to develop a conception of happiness. 
This aspect of rationality is acknowledged by Kant:  
The third stage of reason, after it had meddled with the immediately felt needs [of 
human beings], was the conscious anticipation of the future. This ability to enjoy not 
just the current moment in life but also to represent to oneself the future, often far in 
advance… [is] the most inexhaustible source of worry and distress…. (8:113). 
 
In conclusion, Kant asserts that the simple addition of reason (arrogance not included) to 
our finite nature is enough to lead us from the tendency to pursue inclination all the way to a 
concern about happiness,48 and his theory provides us with a plausible picture of how.  
 
5. What’s Wrong with Happiness?  
 
Kant has the resources, without the Arrogance Account, to explain his commitment to the 
predisposition to humanity as he defines it and to the claim that human beings are unsociably 
social. He also has the resources, with the Satisfaction Account alone, to explain our tendency to 
make use of an ideal of happiness in the first place. But part of the appeal of the Arrogance 
Account is that it can help explain what is bad, in a common-sense way, about putting happiness 
first. Although no empirical principle is fit to ground the moral law, Kant claims, ‘[t]he principle 
of one’s own happiness is the most objectionable’ (4:442); ‘[t]he direct opposite of the principle 
                                                          
48 None of this should be taken to lead to the conclusion that human beings will always, according to Kant, have the 
desire to secure happiness in the sense that most securely tracks their true, long-term well-being as animals. What I 
have argued here is only that Kant can explain why human beings come to be concerned with an ideal of happiness 
in general (that is, a collection or system of inclinations instead of a mere procession of them one at a time). I have 
not argued that we can expect this ideal to always include a long and healthy life or other things we might think of as 
essential components of our physical well-being as animals. Pinheiro Walla (2015) argues, for instance, that there is 
nothing prudentially irrational about Kant’s gout-sufferer’s rejection of his long-term health (or his “objective” 
happiness) in the Groundwork because the life-style change required to secure his health would cost him enough in 
satisfaction to make it really not worth it in terms of satisfaction alone (or in terms of his “subjective” happiness) 
(38). I do not intend to have said anything that would resist that conclusion. 
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of morality is the principle of one’s own happiness made the determining ground of the will’ 
(5:35). It seems that Kant finds something particularly dangerous about taking conformity with 
the pursuit of happiness as one’s primary principle for action, and the Arrogance Account 
provides a clear reason why. According to the Arrogance Account, at the root of the human 
desire for happiness is an attempt to gain a status one could not possibly deserve, fueled by false, 
arrogant beliefs.  
 If this explanation is not correct, then what, really, is especially wrong with our tendency 
to make use of the principle of happiness as though it were our principle of morality? The truth is 
that there is not much the Satisfaction Account can tell us about why Kant finds this so 
problematic. That, however, is as it should be. The only way to fully justify Kant’s stance on this 
issue is to explicate the role Kant thinks morality is supposed to play in human lives. Only with a 
better understanding of what the moral law does for us can we see clearly why the principle of 
happiness cannot do the same.49 Because it is a reading only of Kant’s theory of human 
happiness, the Satisfaction Account does not bring us all the way to a full account of this 
problem. What the Satisfaction Account does make clear is the following: simply because they 
are rational and subject to inclination, human beings want, in a powerful and basic way, to 
become happy—and their experience with pursuing happiness teaches them that it is frustratingly 
                                                          
49 One way of understanding the role morality plays in human lives, according to Kant, is as follows: for any free 
and rational being (human beings included), the moral law lays out what that being must do in order to act out its 
freedom effectively, without undermining itself. Janelle Dewitt (2013) develops this notion of fit between morally 
right actions and our free nature in her account of respect, and Seiriol Morgan (2008) also holds that this is one 
essential function of morality according to Kant. In Luciana Samamé’s (2013) analysis of Kant’s three arguments 
against the suitability of the principle of happiness to be a moral law, she also argues that Kant rejects it partially 
because of its insufficiency for completely realizing our humanity. Our inclinations cannot serve as a guaranteed 
substitute for the moral law because they track the well-being (or at least the satisfaction, which sometimes does not 
even amount to the true well-being) of only part of us (the sensible part). Gary Watson (1983) hits upon this point 
when he explains: “In Kant’s theory, the true antagonist to morality is not happiness or self-regard, but our persistent 
tendency to evaluate our lives solely from the point of view of ourselves as creatures of natural need, governed by 
pleasure and pain” (85). 
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and perpetually elusive. Given these facts, it seems plausible that part of the special danger of 
subbing in the principle of happiness for the moral law is simply the undeniable attractiveness of 
this substitution to human beings.  
The Satisfaction Account is meant only to capture what Kant thinks about what human 
happiness is and why human beings want it. For Kant, capturing these aspects of human life does 
not yet capture human goodness or evil. Our desire for happiness just simply is not the same 
thing as our moral compass—and that, however we spell out the details, is Kant’s reason for 
insisting that we should not act as though it were. As Kant writes, ‘[t]he majesty of duty has 
nothing to do with the enjoyment of life… and even though one might want to shake both of 
them together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick soul, they soon 




 In conclusion, although the Arrogance Account can provide an explanation of Kant’s 
assertion that human beings are competitive, we can use a simpler story about the human 
desire for happiness to explain even these features of human beings. On this story, happiness 
is originally attractive to human beings not because they are arrogant, but because they are 
finite creatures with rational capacities that multiply their desires, reshape those desires in 
complex ways, and make it impossible to live in the moment without an eye to future 
consequences. Aside from serving as a reading of Kant on human happiness, the Arrogance 
Account has also shaped the way many scholars understand Kant’s theory of immorality. The 
Satisfaction Account, then, brings with it the opportunity to reassess Kant’s theory of 
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immorality and to approach his moral theory as a whole from a different angle, as a theory 
that is meant not only to reign in arrogance, but also to teach human beings how to 
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At Arm’s Length: Kant on Self-Respect 




It is no secret that respect is an important part of Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. When 
people draw upon Kant, they often draw in particular on his claim that humanity is to be 
respected. To take just one example, Denis G. Arnold and Norman E. Bowie (2003) make use of 
Kant’s claim that human beings must be respected to critique the use of sweatshop labor. 
According to these authors, Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative (which 
instructs us to never use humanity, whether in the person of ourselves or others, as a mere means 
to some end) is both compelling enough to stand on its own and essential for understanding what 
is really wrong with this practice. My project here will be to raise and address a problem for this 
often-referenced aspect of Kant’s theory. Respect as a moral concept has certainly not gone 
uncriticized,50 and Kant’s conception of and emphasis on respect in particular have been the 
focal point of objections to his moral theory.51 The problem with which I will begin, however, is 
a new one, and it bears specifically on Kant’s use of the notion of self-respect. 
Kant holds that human beings have a moral obligation to act in accordance with proper 
respect for themselves (6:403). He also holds that it is an important condition of our receptivity 
                                                          
50 One such criticism notes that calls for “self-respect” are often invoked as a tool to blame the victims of injustice 
for their treatment, as when women are told that proper self-respect requires modesty and that their supposed lack of 
modesty (and hence of self-respect) is what leads men to be sexually aggressive toward them, or young black men 
are told that people would respect them if they first “respected” themselves (often with the assumption that this 
would involve dressing more formally). 
51 Some examples, all of which I will touch on in a bit more detail later in the paper, include Michael Neumann 
(2000), Robin S. Dillon (1995), Rae Langton (1992), Julia Annas (1984), Susan Wolf (1982), and Friedrich Schiller 
(1793). 
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to morality that the moral law be capable of calling up our self-respect (6:399). Commentators 
have often read Kant as also holding that the most serious obstacle to virtue for human beings is 
self-indulgent arrogance. And this reading is not without pull. Kant claims that one of the major 
flaws in human beings, which the moral law has to strike down in order to call up respect, is 
“self-conceit” (5:73), and it is a prominent part of his theory of human nature that human beings 
have a tendency to try to dominate and one-up each other.52 This reading is also not so strange to 
our everyday thinking about immorality. It is somewhat natural to think that immoral people are 
arrogant. 
However, Kant’s emphasis on self-respect does not sit easily with this view of 
immorality. It looks, on the face of it, as though a theorist who holds that human beings are 
deeply arrogant would also hold that we should exercise some caution in how much we dwell on 
the moral importance of self-respect. Surely beings who tend to think they are much better than 
those around them do not need any reminder that they are important. And in fact, impressing 
upon them the importance of acting self-respectfully would seem to run the risk of encouraging 
them to double-down on the arrogant thinking towards which they are always tending. Jeanine 
Grenberg (2005) raises this point in her argument that the primary Kantian self-regarding virtue 
is humility. As she puts it, “[t]o emphasize the moral necessity of self-respect for a kind of being 
who already has a tendency to place self-love above morality is a dangerous thing indeed” (184-
5).  
The trouble is that Kant seems to be doing just this dangerous thing. He claims that it is 
not only respect for the law and for others that the moral law impresses upon us, but respect for 
                                                          
52 Commentators who have recognized and catalogued this aspect of Kant’s theory include J. B. Schneewind (2009), 
Barbara Herman (2009), and Allen Wood (2001, 1999, 1996), among others. I argue elsewhere (contra Allen Wood) 
[Paper Two] that Kant can explain this part of his theory without recourse to the claim that human beings have a 
tendency toward arrogance. 
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ourselves, writing that “the law within [the human being] unavoidably forces from him respect 
for his own being” (6:403; see also 5:87). In his discussion of the effect that our awareness of our 
moral obligations has on us, he writes that the moral law’s “subjective effect on feeling… [can] 
be called self-approbation” (5:81). The problem is worse still because Kant also claims that our 
duties to ourselves, duties that are run through with calls to self-respect, are the most important 
ones of all (27:340-341). In light of the prevalent reading of Kant’s theory of immorality, these 
passages ring just about as oddly as would passages announcing that the moral law calls up in 
human beings a direct appreciation for their happiness.  
In this paper, I will explain how and why Kant conceives of self-respect and the duty to 
act according to it as morally essential. In order to do this, I will propose revisions of how we 
read Kant’s theory from both sides. First, on the side of Kant’s theory of immorality, I will 
present the view that Kant thinks immorality is arrogant (or self-conceited) only in a somewhat 
technical sense, and one that does not always correlate with what I call “interpersonal” 
arrogance. Interpersonal arrogance is the kind of arrogance in which a person thinks they are 
worth more than other people. On Kant’s view, our immoral behavior is arrogant because it 
involves an overestimation of human nature—but this overestimation does not always lead us to 
positive assessments of ourselves (as worth much), as I will explain. Second, on the side of 
Kant’s theory of morality, I will argue that we should understand Kantian self-respect not merely 
as a valuing attitude, but as a specific type of valuing attitude that is appropriate for human 
beings to have toward themselves because they are both moral and animal. This way of valuing 
oneself stands in direct contrast to the kind of self-valuing we find in self-conceit.  
One major criticism of Kant’s theory of self-respect has been that “respecting” oneself in 
Kant’s way involves distinguishing between one’s animal and one’s purely rational self and 
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problematically downplaying or ignoring the former. My reading of Kant on respect will also 
provide a new reply to this objection. Commentators have often defended Kant from this charge 
by pointing to evidence in his texts that he considered harmony between morality and animality 
an important part of human virtue—emphasizing, for instance, his support for the cultivation of 
emotions that line up well with morality. 53 There is something unsatisfying about this type of 
solution, however. There is plentiful evidence in Kant’s texts that he considered the disharmony 
between animality and morality an important component of the human relationship with 
morality. Kant has also often been criticized for precisely this emphasis on disharmony. For 
example, Kant’s contemporary, Friedrich Schiller, raised the concern that Kant’s theory would 
lead people to associate morality with struggle and suffering. The account of self-respect I offer 
in this paper embraces the disharmony aspect of Kant’s theory in full, and I will explain how 
such an account need not (and in fact cannot) encourage human beings to disown or disregard 
their animality. In the process, I also hope to offer a more positive way of thinking about Kant’s 
emphasis on disharmony itself. First, I will turn to Kant’s claim that immorality involves self-
conceit. 
 
1. Self-Conceited Immorality  
 
1.1 Exchanging the Moral Law for Self-Love 
Kant claims that immorality is self-conceited. But what does this mean? “Self-conceit” is 
a tendency Kant claims the moral law must strike down in human beings in order to call up their 
                                                          
53 See Anne Margaret Baxley (2010), Paul Formosa (2010), Sandra Fairbanks (2000), Paul Guyer (1993). 
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respect for morality (5:73).54 It serves as an important obstacle to human virtue, then, and a 
correct understanding of it should provide insight into the sense in which Kant thinks immorality 
involves arrogance. Kant is clear that self-conceit is connected to our inclinations. Before going 
into more detail about how, it will be helpful to briefly discuss what “inclinations” are, according 
to Kant. Inclination (Neigung) is Kant’s word for our animal desires—physical in that they 
motivate us typically by means of pleasure and pain. These desires are determined by contingent 
factors like our body chemistry, how we were brought up, and the causal sequence of events 
leading to a given moment in our lives. It is important to note, though, that the category of 
animal desire is extremely broad, for Kant. On Kant’s understanding of human nature, even our 
merely animal desires include complex social components (particularly because we are rational 
animals). We form a conception of happiness by gathering all the inclinations we can into a 
consistent set.55 Because the moral law, unlike our inclinations, is determined purely by reason, 
there is no guarantee that we will ever be inclined (want) to do what we are morally required to 
do. Acting morally well will not necessarily promote our happiness. In this sense, inclination and 
the fact that we are subject to it leads to an always-possible resistance to the moral law in us. 
 When we are self-conceited, however, our inclinations “constitute” or “make-up” 
(ausmachen) our self-satisfaction or self-esteem (5:73). It is not obvious how inclinations could 
do this. The esteem of self-esteem is a positive judgment that is unlike merely liking something. 
In order to esteem something we need to think that the positive judgment we have about the 
                                                          
54 This is true, at least, of the instance of it under discussion here. I do not think that Kant always uses the word self-
conceit (Eigendünkel) in precisely the same way. He uses it to describe a variety of tendencies, attitudes or 
behaviors with the common trait of treating something as though it were worth more than it actually is. The instance 
of self-conceit under discussion here, though, is a tendency which Kant holds is part of human immorality in 
general. This is evidenced by the role it plays in the process that calls up our respect for the moral law, a feeling 
Kant claims is a priori possible for all of us. 
55 Kant writes that it is in the “idea [of happiness] that all inclinations unite in one sum” (4:399); and he also uses 
this definition in the following aside: “All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system 
and the satisfaction of which is then called one’s own happiness)” (5:73). 
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object in question has been earned. The question Kant’s definition of self-conceit raises, then, is: 
How could human beings ever get from a collection of their wants and needs to a conclusion 
about the esteem they have earned for themselves?  
 On my reading,56 the way we do this is as follows. We take the conception of happiness 
we are able to construct with our inclinations, and instead of using that as an ideal to inform what 
we should do to make ourselves better off, we use it as a road-map for what we must do in order 
to earn worth for ourselves and add value to our lives. Hence, we tend to think that as we are 
gaining happiness for ourselves, we are also earning worth. This way of understanding self-
conceit fits well with what Kant says about the error that underlies the problematic tendency. 
Kant’s description of the error is below. In it, he first describes a separate propensity called self-
love, and then proceeds to describe self-conceit.  
Here is Kant’s description:  
[The] propensity to make oneself as having subjective determining grounds of choice 
into the objective determining ground of the will in general can be called self-love; 
and if self-love makes itself lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle, it 
can be called self-conceit. (5:74) 
 
When Kant refers to “oneself as having subjective determining grounds of choice” in this 
passage, he is referring to human beings as beings who are subject to contingent, private desires. 
Basically, this phrase refers to the human being conceived of as a human animal, subject to 
inclinations. In self-love, we take ourselves, conceived of in this way, and make that into “the 
objective determining ground of the will in general.” That is: we allow ourselves as human 
animals to determine the facts about what we really ought to do in a given case. My gloss on 
                                                          
56 Elsewhere [Paper One], I argue that this reading is the correct understanding of what Kant means when he 
discusses self-conceit, in contrast to other proposals. Here, however, my goal is to show how this reading of self-
conceit can help us understand what Kant means by (and finds important about) self-respect, so I will simply present 
the reading instead of arguing for it. That being said, the fact that this reading of self-conceit can help us understand 
self-respect’s importance in Kant’s theory constitutes, I think, a separate argument in favor of it. 
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self-love, then, is that it is the tendency to think that one should act in ways that satisfy or look 
after one’s happiness.  
 Kant does not think that self-love is, in itself, problematic. It would not be a good idea for 
us to never follow the line of reasoning from what we want to what we should do. In self-conceit, 
however, we take this tendency and we elevate it into an “unconditional practical principle.” Our 
next task, then, if we are to understand what self-conceit is, will be to determine what it means to 
make something into an unconditional practical principle. According to Kant, the only truly 
unconditional practical principle—that is, the only thing we must conform to no matter what else 
we do—is the moral law. In allowing self-love to play this role, what we are really doing is 
allowing self-love to play the role that morality is supposed to play in our lives. To understand 
what self-conceit is, we must have a clear picture of this role.  
 
1.2 Kant on Morality’s Role 
 One way of thinking about the role that morality is supposed to play in our lives is as a 
regulator of our interactions with others. On this way of thinking about morality, it primarily 
restricts our otherwise unconstrained pursuit of our own interests such that we do not trample the 
interests of others. If this were the main function of morality, then allowing self-love to step into 
this role would seem quite straight-forwardly to constitute interpersonal arrogance. In 
exchanging the moral law for self-love, I would simply be allowing facts about what is best for 
my own happiness to determine the rules for how I interact with and treat others.  
However, this understanding of the role of morality in our lives, and consequently this 
characterization of what it means to place self-love in that role, is too narrow to capture Kant’s 
view. Kant does not think that the moral law has only—or even most centrally—the role of 
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regulating our interactions with others. On Kant’s view, the moral law also regulates our actions 
in view of ourselves. In fact, Kant believes that one’s duties to oneself are particularly important. 
He writes in the Lectures on Ethics that:  
[N]o part of morals has been more defectively treated than [that] of the duties to 
oneself… it has been considered a trifling matter, and mentioned only at the end, as a 
supplement to morality, in the belief that once a man has fulfilled all his duties, he 
may finally also think about himself. So far from these duties being the lowest, they 
actually take first place, and are the most important of all (27:340-341). 
 
If the role morality plays is just as much about regulating how we act with regards to ourselves 
as it is about regulating how we act with regards to others, then we require a different 
characterization of that role than the one with which we started. 
Luckily, Kant does give an alternative characterization of this role. As we have already 
seen, Kant considers it to be of central importance that the moral law gives us directions we are 
to follow no matter what else we want or do. The role morality plays in our lives, according to 
Kant, is that of being our “vocation” (Kant refers to the fulfillment of morality as our vocation 
(Bestimmung) in various places: 4:396; 5:87; 6:437; 8:39, 287-288). Fulfilling the moral law is, 
you might say, the most important job of our lives. Tied up with this claim, for Kant, is the claim 
that our ability to fulfill it is the source of the worth of humanity. As Kant explains in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, without moral goodness, all the other kinds of 
goodness are undermined. He claims that “[i]t is impossible to think of anything at all in the 
world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good 
will” (4:393) and that, by contrast, “talents of mind” and “qualities of temperament” may be 
“desirable for many purposes, but they can also be extremely evil and harmful if the will which 
is to make use of these gifts…is not good” (4:393).  
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When we allow self-love to play the role in our lives that morality is supposed to play, 
then, we think and act as though it were self-love and not morality, that were our vocation—as 
though fulfilling it instead of the moral law were the source of our worth. At this point, I can 
offer a full characterization of my reading of self-conceit and hence of the sense in which, 
according to Kant, immorality always involves arrogance. Self-conceit is satisfaction (or 
dissatisfaction) with oneself premised solely on how happy one is, based in the implicit belief 
that one’s self-love is the most important vocation of one’s life. On this reading of self-conceit, 
the tendency is still, in a sense, arrogant, as I will explain in section 3. However, it does not 
always lead to interpersonal arrogance. On Kant’s view, as I will explain next, immorality is not 
always self-affirming. 
 
2. How Making Happiness our Vocation Fails to be Self-Affirming 
 
Self-conceit cannot be exactly the same as interpersonal arrogance. This is so because 
self-conceit involves basing one’s self-esteem on one’s level of happiness, and this level is not 
guaranteed to be satisfactory. Although self-conceit would lead to interpersonal arrogance for 
people who were generally better off than those around them, it would tend to produce exactly 
the opposite effect in less fortunate circumstances: it would make it more difficult for us to 
believe that we were beings of any worth, due any kind of respect. And cases of relative 
unhappiness are not nonexistent, according to Kant.  
 In fact, we have reason to think that on his view dissatisfaction is more commonplace 
than happiness. The pursuit of inclination, according to Kant, is marked for the most part by 
failures to satisfy ourselves. Kant often characterizes the human relationship to inclination as a 
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stressful one. He claims, for instance, that “the inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are 
so far from having an absolute worth… that it must instead be the universal wish of every 
rational being to be altogether free from them” (4:428) and elsewhere that inclinations “are 
always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from 
him the wish to be rid of them” (5:118). These kinds of claims are sometimes presented as 
evidence that Kant thought inclination (and the animal aspect of us in which it inheres) is 
meaningless and or to be disowned. Both of these quotes also come from within the context of 
Kant’s moral writings, which might suggest that his point here is simply that inclinations make 
acting morally well more difficult.  
In fact, however, Kant makes these claims in light of a broader view of inclination 
according to which chasing after it is a high-stakes and losing game—one we cannot opt out of. 
In discussing the nature of pleasure and pain in his anthropological writings, Kant raises the 
question whether the feeling of pleasure is a positive increase in pleasant feeling or rather only 
the ceasing of pain. He concludes that the former is impossible57 (7:232). Kant’s rationale for the 
conclusion that pleasure can only be a temporary lessening of pain is a technical one—that 
increases in pleasure are increases in energy, and so if we were to continuously experience such 
increases we would basically combust. As he puts it, "what else but a quick death from joy would 
follow from a continuous promotion of the vital force" (7:231). For our purposes, however, it is 
significant that Kant is led to the conclusion that we experience pleasure only because we are 
driven out of whatever state we were previously in by pain and hence, “pain must always 
                                                          
57 Kant cites his agreement on this point with Count Pietro Verri. This aspect of Kant's understanding of inclination 
has been noted by other commentators. It is explicated, for example, by Sonia Sikka (2007) in her comparison of 
Kant with his student Johann Gottfried von Herder, and by Rachel Zuckert (2002). Gary Watson (1983) also notes 
that the pursuit of inclination is characterized by displeasure, not satisfaction, according to Kant. This view of 
inclination is also not surprising in a person who had Kant's personal experience with embodiment. As Susan Meld 
Shell (1996) details, he suffered physical pain relatively consistently throughout his life, because of what he self-
diagnosed as “hypochondria.” 
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precede every enjoyment; pain is always first” (7:231). Nature, according to Kant, has set us up 
such that contentment, even contentment "from the pragmatic point of view (being content with 
the well-being that [one] intends to secure through skill and prudence)" is "unattainable" for us—
our incentive for action is "pain... that [we] cannot escape from" (7:234-235). 
 We can also see that Kant thinks our pursuit of inclination is marked by struggle in his 
characterization of the pursuit of happiness more directly. The achievement of happiness is 
perpetually uncertain for human beings, on Kant’s view. In the Critique of Practical Reason, he 
describes our desire for happiness as a “problem” for us:  
[S]atisfaction with one’s whole existence is not, as it were, an original possession and 
a beatitude, which would presuppose a consciousness of one’s independent self-
sufficiency, but is instead a problem imposed upon him by his finite nature itself, 
because he is needy (5:25).  
 
Here Kant explains that our happiness is, in a sense, a troublesome preoccupation for us. This is 
so because we are not “self-sufficient” beings. Our conception of happiness includes the 
acquisition of things outside of us, over which we have limited control. Even to the extent that 
we know exactly what we want, then, we may find ourselves unable to achieve it.  
More than this, Kant claims that our happiness is also something of a moving target—our 
wants are usually in the process of changing and multiplying. This is a natural result of the fact 
that we have rational capacities that can meddle with our wants as well as our ideas about how to 
fulfill them. Rationality allows human beings to multiply and extend their desires beyond what 
non-rational animals experience, making human happiness more elusive than say, rabbit 
happiness. In the "Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” Kant claims that the fact that 
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human beings are rational thrusts them into "a series of... afflictions" that might even be 
conceived of as a "punishment" (8:115).58  
When we imagine a life dedicated to the pursuit of inclination, we might imagine a life of 
luxury and ease. For Kant, however, this image is a fantasy. Kant is unwilling to claim that 
human beings can be made perfectly happy simply by acting morally well, and he often 
emphasizes cases of moral action that require the sacrifice of things wanted. But this does not 
indicate, as it might initially seem, that Kant grants the other side of the coin: that immorality is 
in some sense a faster and easier route to happiness and a satisfied life. On Kant’s theory of 
human nature, there simply is, for most of us in most situations, no such route at all—immoral or 
not.  
 Self-conceit is not the same as interpersonal arrogance because in falling prey to self-
conceit, we conceive of success in the highly contingent and failure-prone mission for happiness 
as the vocation of our lives and the thing on which our worth depends. It is only with a fair bit of 
luck that self-conceit could lead us to think we are worth more than others. By itself, this already 
relieves some of the tension between Kant’s claim that immorality involves self-conceit and his 
claim that self-respect is especially morally important, since it is already clear that Kant’s view 
of immorality does not entail that most people already have a strong sense of their own value, 
standing in need only of the reminder that others matter, too. Still, we need to go further. Kant 
does not say that the moral law calls up self-respect particularly in the unhappy. Self-respect is 
supposed to be important across the board. In order to see why it is, I will turn next to the sense 
in which self-conceit is a kind of arrogance. 
                                                          
58 He also puts a similar doctrine forward in his "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective," 
claiming that the progress and innovation that are so important to rational development in human beings are driven 
in part by perpetual unhappiness. 
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3. The Arrogance of Self-Conceit and the Human Relationship to Morality 
 
Being self-conceited is not the same as thinking you are superior to others. Still, it 
remains a kind of arrogance, for Kant, because of the assumptions self-conceited agents make 
about their relationship to the moral law. Here is Kant on the proper form of that relationship:  
The moral level on which a human being… stands is respect for the moral law. The 
disposition incumbent upon him to have in observing it is to do so from duty, not 
from voluntary liking or even from an endeavor he undertakes unbidden, gladly and 
of his own accord; and his proper moral condition, in which he can always be, is 
virtue, that is, moral disposition in conflict, and not holiness in the supposed 
possession of a complete purity of dispositions of the will. (5:84) 
 
 In this passage, Kant offers two different models for how a person might be oriented 
toward the moral law. We can call these, following Kant, the respectful and the holy model of 
morality. Persons who are respectful in relation to the moral law conform to it, as he explains, in 
conflict with themselves, with a certain amount of internal resistance. Persons who are holy in 
relation to the moral law, by contrast, do what is morally right in full harmony with 
themselves—they act well and “gladly.”  
 Kant insists that of these two models, human beings must operate on the respectful 
model. He does not mean by this that we experience resistance to the moral law in every case. 
Kant does not hold that we never happen to want to do what is also the morally right thing to do. 
The mere fact that I find something enjoyable does not amount to evidence that that thing is 
morally problematic—it simply also does not amount to evidence that it is not. Our resistance to 
morality is also not resistance to morality as such. In other words, we do not feel reluctant to 
fulfill our moral obligations because that would be the right thing to do. If we had this attitude 
toward morality, it would amount to what Kant refers to in Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason as “malice,” which he claims is properly “diabolical” and not human (6:37). The 
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resistance experienced in the respectful model of moral action is something more general than 
either of these. When we commit ourselves to morality, we do so in the awareness that our 
obligations will never be guaranteed to line up with that other goal that will never fail to matter 
to us: our happiness. Our moral action is not harmonious. 
Kant’s insistence that human moral action is to some degree conflicted is not limited to 
those passages in which he raises the contrasting possibility of having a holy will. Rather, it runs 
throughout his discussion of morality and shapes the very basic concepts he uses. Kant 
consistently discusses morality in terms of “duty.” He does this because conceiving of the moral 
law as one’s duty is integral to keeping oneself in a respectful orientation toward it. Kant’s 
description of the concept of duty itself refers to the fact that the moral law is constraining: 
The very concept of duty is already the concept of a necessitation (constraint) of free 
choice through the law…. The moral imperative59 makes this constraint known 
through the categorical nature of its pronouncement (the unconditional ought). Such 
constraint, therefore, does not apply to rational beings as such (there could also be 
holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational natural beings, who are unholy 
enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though they 
recognize its authority; and even when they do obey the law, they do it reluctantly (in 
the face of opposition from their inclinations), and it is in this that such constraint 
properly consists. (6:379) 
   
It is an integral component of Kant’s moral theory, then, that human beings have a 
disharmonious and hence respectful relationship with the moral law, where this involves valuing 
the moral law as something constraining and disharmonious with oneself. Self-conceit amounts 
                                                          
59 The fact that human beings must act morally under constraint is also the source of Kant’s discussion of the moral 
law as an imperative. “Imperative” is, for Kant a technical term that means something like “command.” Its use 
makes explicit reference to the fact that the agent subject to the command might not want to obey it. In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces imperatives explicitly as the form that laws take when 
“reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will [of the person to whom the law applies, i.e.] if [their] 
will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with objective ones” 
(4:412). The moral law takes imperatival form for us specifically because we are not “holy” beings, but beings who 
are capable of being moved by a sensibility that does not necessarily track the moral law (see also 5:32). Kant makes 
this point again in the Critique of Practical Reason, when he explains that “for a being in whom reason quite alone 
is not the determining ground of the will, [the moral law] is an imperative, that is, a rule indicated by an ‘ought’” 
(5:20).  
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to a kind of arrogance because self-conceited individuals run afowl of this by leaping 
immediately from facts about what they most want and need to conclusions about what kinds of 
things give them moral worth. In making this leap, they implicitly assume that there is a harmony 
between these things, when in reality, there is not. They deliberate as though their wills were 
holy. 
Kant had often been criticized for the emphasis on disharmony that makes it so clear why 
he rejects self-conceit. For example, Kant’s contemporary, Friedrich Schiller (1793), raises the 
concern that Kant’s emphasis on duty gives the impression that morality involves a constant war 
with one’s nature. Such a view, Schiller worries, encourages people to associate moral behavior 
with misery and self-punishment. Schiller recommends instead that Kant should encourage his 
readers to aspire to what Schiller calls “the beautiful soul” (151). 60 This model is meant to 
achieve not just dignity, but also the “grace” mentioned in Schiller’s title. The beautiful soul is a 
moral agent whose sensible desires have come to harmonize with their moral obligations so fully 
                                                          
60 My focus here is on Kant’s view, not Schiller’s, so I am not exploring in full how the best reading of Kant and the 
best reading of Schiller distinguish them from each other—it may turn out that on a sophisticated reading of both 
there is no very large difference, as Kant himself suggests in his reply to Schiller (6:23fn). As Anne Margaret 
Baxley (2010) points out, however, Kant’s concession in this same reply is only that a happy exterior can sometimes 
serve as an indicator of a more full-fledged inner commitment to morality. This does not fully endorse Schiller’s 
claim, which was that virtue is not complete without harmony between one’s sensibility and moral obligations. 
Jeffrey Barnouw (1980) also argues that there remains an important distinction between Schiller’s and Kant’s 
approach, which is evident in their differing approaches to the aesthetic experiences of the sublime and the beautiful. 
Whereas Schiller generally aims to undermine distinctions between what might seem like different experiences or 
ways of being (the sublime and the beautiful; acting out of desire and acting out of duty), Kant is dedicated to 
preserving such distinctions in their opposition. Reed Winegar (2013) argues that Kant’s more complete response to 
Schiller addresses the other philosopher’s concern by insisting that the moral law can still be conceived of as 
something constraining without our perceiving this constraint as oppressive. This reply by Kant relies heavily, 
according to Winegar, on Kant’s theory of the sublime as an aesthetic experience. Winegar’s reading is further 
supported by some interesting differences between Schiller’s description of the beautiful soul and Kant’s description 
of the appropriately uplifted virtuous attitude. When Kant grants to Schiller that joy seems most appropriate to the 
aesthetic of virtue, the way he puts the point is that the “aesthetic constitution” or “temperament” of moral action 
would have to be “courageous and hence cheerful”, not “weighed down by fear and dejected” (6:23fn). Schiller’s 
description of the beautiful soul, by contrast, involves a “gentle heart,” a complete lack of “tension,” and a musical 
voice, none of which seem particularly to be a paradigmatic part of the courageous cheer to which Kant refers. With 
the association Kant also draws between courage and the sublime, these differences seem to further suggest 
Winegar’s reading. 
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that the concept of duty is no longer really essential to their moral actions. They are still subject 
to moral duty, technically speaking, but able to fulfill their duty fully out of love, and happily. 
This model of moral action, I suggest, comes closer to the model we see in Kant’s “holy” will, in 
which the agent acts morally well and enjoys doing so. 
There is certainly something appealing about this model. And understandably, others 
have been sympathetic to the worry that Kant’s theory associates morality with inner struggle 
and misery. Hegel accused Kant of “producing a view of morality as nothing but a bitter, 
unending, struggle against self-satisfaction” (84), for example. More recent scholars have also 
raised this worry. Susan Wolf (1982) argues that the saint of the Kantian moral ideal would, if 
we met such a person in real life, seem to us to suffer from “a pathological fear of damnation… 
or an extreme form of self-hatred that interferes with his ability to enjoy the enjoyable life” 
(424).61 Julia Annas (1984) argues that the dedication to duty demanded by Kant’s ethics leads to 
a life empty of meaning and destructive of relationships, and Rae Langton (1992) raises the 
challenge that Kant has underestimated the importance of inclination to living a valuable human 
life.  
These criticisms have a strong pull in the world of moral theory and of Kant 
interpretation. It seems to many philosophers that it is a deficiency in a moral theory if it fails to 
address the importance of bringing one’s emotions in line with duty (or vice versa) and, in that 
sense, making moral behavior more natural to oneself. Kant scholars have pushed back on Kant’s 
behalf for the most part by pointing out that he cares more about aligning one’s feelings and 
desire for happiness with morality than is sometimes supposed.62 And it is true that Kant does 
                                                          
61 Wolf does not argue in favor of the beautiful soul in this paper, however. She sees that ideal of moral sainthood as 
problematic, too, although in a different way. 
62 See Anne Margaret Baxley (2010), Paul Formosa (2010), Sandra Fairbanks (2000), Paul Guyer (1993). 
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not completely reject the value of the holy model of moral action. This is evident, for instance, in 
the passage right after he claims that human beings should aim for respect, not liking, for the 
moral law. There, Kant grants that “holiness of will is nevertheless a practical idea, which must 
necessarily serve as a model to which all finite rational beings can only approximate without 
end” (5:32-33).  
Harmonious moral action is valuable as an ideal to strive after in the long term, for Kant. 
This is also evident in his doctrine of the highest good. The highest good is the “object” of 
morality, according to Kant—the goal we reasonably strive for with our moral actions, and 
which we implicitly assume must be possible (5:107-110). Although the highest good requires 
moral perfection above all, Kant claims that the moral perfection of human beings is not enough 
on its own to constitute “the complete good” as conceived of by beings like us—“for this,” he 
explains, “happiness is also required” (5:110). Hence, the complete ideal for which we ultimately 
strive in our moral actions, according to Kant, is “virtue and happiness together” (5:110) with 
each still being conceived of as distinct from the other (5:111-13). Kant’s insistence on including 
the actual achievement of happiness harmonized with moral behavior in his conception of the 
highest good again indicates that he does not mean to spurn the value of harmonizing sensibility 
and morality entirely. 
The holy model of moral action is not entirely absent from Kant’s system, then. But its 
role is as an ideal—something always in the distance, to be approached, instead of something we 
should ever consider fully realized in or applicable to everyday actions. It is important not to 
underplay Kant’s continued emphasis on duty and disharmony in the here and now. The reading 
of self-conceit I have proposed in this paper makes this especially clear. The arrogance involved 
in self-conceit is precisely that self-conceited agents make too little of the difference between the 
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ideal case and their own. They assume that they have already achieved or were naturally born 
with a kind of holiness of will, with impulses that are perfectly morally responsive and even 
morally reliable. Self-conceit is arrogant, then, not because the self-conceited agent believes they 
are superior to other human beings, but because they think and act as though human nature itself 
is morally ideal in a way it is not. This is a strange variety of arrogance, and it is not one that 
seems to call straightforwardly for a reminder to be humble. That result is as it should be, 
because Kant thinks that the cure for self-conceit is not (just) humility, but (also) self-respect. 
 
4. What is Self-Respect? 
 
Self-respect is directly opposed to self-conceit. In order to see why, it will be helpful first 
to focus only on the “respect” (Achtung) aspect of self-respect. We have already seen at this 
point that respect as an orientation toward the moral law stands in opposition to the close and 
sensibly harmonious relationship that would justify self-conceit. This is so because respecting 
the moral law involves valuing it specifically as something constraining. For example, Kant 
writes that “[t]he consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, yet as combined with 
an unavoidable constraint put on all inclinations… is respect for the law” (5:80, emphasis mine). 
Elsewhere, he defines respect as “properly the representation of a worth that infringes upon my 
self-love” (4:401fn, emphasis mine).  
The respect component of self-respect encodes this same appropriate orientation. We 
know this must be the case in part because according to Kant, all respect has its source in respect 
for the moral law. As he explains in a footnote, when one examines our respect for persons “one 
becomes aware that it always rests on consciousness of a duty which an example holds before us, 
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and that, accordingly, respect can never have any but a moral ground” (5:81fn). There is perhaps 
something unintuitive in the idea that our respect for ourselves could be in any sense the same 
attitude as our respect for the moral law. When we respect the moral law, we see it as something 
that limits us—that we must obey. This seems to involve lowering ourselves and our pretentions. 
Respect for oneself, on the other hand, seems as though it ought to be uplifting, akin to self-
esteem. The concern that there is a conflict here brings me to another important aspect of respect, 
which accompanies it wherever it occurs in Kant’s work: that it is complex. 
An essential element of respect—in fact, the thing that makes it what it is—is that it 
involves a kind of intermixing of positive and negative components. This is evident in Kant’s 
discussion of the aesthetic experience of the sublime, for instance. The things that Kant says 
about this aesthetic experience are important to our understanding of what respect involves 
because Kant explains our experience of the sublime by claiming that when we experience 
objects as sublime, what we are really experiencing is respect. Specifically, we are experiencing 
respect for our vocation to realize the moral law:  
[T]he feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation, which we show 
to an object in nature through a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the 
object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject)…. (5:257) 
 
The details of what sublimity involves, then, also provide some details about what respect 
involves—and these details confirm that complexity is an important part of both.  
Kant contrasts sublimity with another aesthetic experience—beauty. When a person 
experiences something as beautiful or as sublime, they are struck by a unique state of mind 
called up by the object in question. This object can be an object of art or nature, but I will stay 
with Kant’s discussion of natural objects here, for ease. The “most important” (5:245) distinction 
between the sublime and the beautiful, according to Kant, is that when we experience beauty, our 
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state of mind is harmonious and directly pleasant, supporting a conception of nature on which 
nature is well-suited to our way of thinking and being in the world. When we experience 
sublimity, by contrast, our state of mind is conflicted: it is both painful and pleasant, supporting a 
conception of nature on which it is chaotic and resistant to us. As Kant puts it:  
[T]hat which, without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the 
feeling of the sublime, …[appears] in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of 
judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to 
our imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that. (5:245) 
 
The tension in our experience of those objects we would call sublime is sometimes the 
result of their unsuitability for our comprehension (this is true in the case of the mathematically 
sublime—think endless horizon) and sometimes the result of their perceived ability to 
completely overpower and destroy us physically (this is true in the case of the dynamically 
sublime—think crashing waterfall). Wherever more precisely the tension comes from, though, it 
is essential to the sublime. What distinguishes the sublime is that “the mind is not merely 
attracted by the [sublime] object [as it is in the beautiful], but is also always reciprocally repelled 
by it” (ibid); the “sublime… pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of the 
senses” (5:267).  
Kant’s explanation of this aesthetic experience in terms of our respect for our vocation 
points to the fact that tension or complexity is also an essential component of respect. Kant also 
claims that it is more appropriate for human beings to represent morality under the aesthetic of 
the sublime than under the aesthetic of the beautiful. His justification for this claim further 
supports the importance of conflict or tension to respect:  
[T]he intellectual, intrinsically purposive (moral) good, judged aesthetically, must not 
be represented so much as beautiful but rather as sublime, so that it arouses more the 
feeling of respect… since human nature does not agree with the good of its own 
accord, but only through the dominion that reason exercises over sensibility. (5:271)  
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In this passage, Kant explains that our respectful relationship with the moral law makes it more 
suitable to represent the goals towards which our moral obligations direct us as sublime than as 
beautiful. This is so precisely because our “nature does not agree” all on its own with whatever 
morality requires, and so our moral action is conflicted. The concept of respect, in sum, is 
something of a focal point for Kant’s emphasis on disharmony in morality.  
Self-respect is often contrasted with self-degradation. This way of analyzing it brings out 
the fact that self-respect involves valuing, instead of failing to value, oneself. In the context of 
Kant’s theory, however, because self-respect is respect, the thing that stands out about it is not so 
much that it is a valuing attitude as that it is a specific kind of valuing attitude—one that 
combines awareness of our worth with a sense of limitation or infringement.  
In fact, when Kant speaks of the attitude morality inspires toward ourselves purely in 
positive terms, he uses a different term for it. Consider the following passage: 
On the other hand, however, since [the constraint of the moral law] is exercised only 
by the lawgiving of his own reason, it also contains something elevating, and the 
subjective effect on feeling… can thus be called self-approbation…. (5:80-81) 
 
Here Kant refers to the elevating attitude toward ourself that follows from our awareness of our 
moral obligations as “self-approbation” (Selbstbilligung) (5:81). Initially, this seems like a mere 
inconsistency in terminology on Kant’s part. The claim that self-respect refers particularly to 
such elevation and approval of oneself along with awareness that the moral law constrains and 
does not necessarily harmonize with one’s whole being, however, implies that it is actually a 
careful reference to only one aspect of the complex attitude that constitutes respect for oneself.  
In order to get ahold of the specific kind of valuing involved in self-respect, it is more 
helpful to contrast it (instead of with self-degradation) with a kind of self-valuing that is not 
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constrained or disharmonious: self-love63. For Kant, to love oneself is specifically to care for 
oneself as an animal with an interest in happiness.64 Recall, though, that happiness does not refer 
simply to a bunch of nice feelings. According to Kant, the happiness of human animals like us 
encompasses and depends upon many complicated things, including relationships with other 
people. Because, according to Kant, we always desire happiness, self-love comes naturally to us. 
This way of valuing ourselves is no constraint on us.  
Self-respect, on the other hand, is a way of valuing ourselves that parallels the way we 
value the moral law: self-respect requires that we come to terms with the fact that our own worth 
as moral beings does not always line up harmoniously with the happiness we also value. Respect 
for the moral law involves acceptance of the fact that we must actively control ourselves, instead 
of simply being carried along by our natures, in order to get our actions to line up with that law. 
We must pursue our happiness carefully because the things that seem most likely to make us 
happy will not always be things that are permissible for us. In parallel, respect for ourselves 
involves acceptance of the fact that we must love ourselves carefully.  
Kant is not concerned that emphasizing the importance of self-respect will encourage our 
immoral tendencies. He need not be, because the caution essential to self-respect is exactly 
opposed to the unrestrained enthusiasm of self-conceit. Respect, recall, is awareness of a worth 
“that infringes upon my self-love” (4:401fn). Emphasizing self-respect, and not only respect for 
the moral law or others, drives home the following point: the worth with which we are 
                                                          
63 Recall from earlier (section 1.1) that self-love names our tendency to conclude that we should go ahead and do 
things that we are most inclined to do. 
64 Kant treats acting out of self-love and acting in pursuit of one’s happiness as interchangeable, as is evident when 
he comments that all rules for action that are material “are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come 
under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness” (5:22). 
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confronted when we consider our moral obligations, the worth that infringes upon our self-love, 
is also our own worth. 
Compared to self-conceit, self-respect involves taking a certain distance from ourselves. 
Instead of being able to take our wants and needs and translate them immediately into the actions 
that come most naturally as a result of them, self-respect requires us to take a step back. We have 
to take in the information our wants and needs provide to us and actively make efforts to 
integrate that information with other aspects of ourselves—in particular our morality, with which 
these things have no guaranteed harmony. If we were the holy beings we imagine ourselves to be 
when we are subject to self-conceit, then this careful distance would not be necessary. 
Kant is not alone in associating self-respect with a kind of cautious regulation of oneself. 
The literature on respect has many variations, in part because respect is closely associated with 
and often discussed by means of other concepts—for example, integrity, dignity, shame. 
Nonetheless, the idea that these concepts involve success or failure at a kind of self-control or 
restraint carries through across many other differences. Aurel Kolnai’s (1976) analysis of dignity 
presents one example. In it, Kolnai covers various different aspects of dignity (dignity as a 
quality, human dignity, the undignified), but his analysis frequently returns to the idea that 
dignity is characterized by a kind of internal regulation, steadiness, or control. As he sees it, it is 
“obvious” that “rational self-control is an integral aspect of dignity” (256). Kolnai’s analysis also 
contrasts dignity, as Kant’s analysis contrasts respect, with liking. What is “most important” to 
dignity in human beings, according to Kolnai is the ability “to be able to endure what one ‘gets’ 
without necessarily assenting to it and growing to ‘like’ it” (262).  
Self-control is also referenced in John Rawls’s (1995) analysis of self-respect and shame, 
although Rawls’s definition of self-respect does not tie it obviously to self-control. Rawls defines 
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self-respect as confidence in the worth of one’s life-plan and in one’s ability to carry it out. In his 
discussion of shame, however, in which agents take a blow to their self-respect, the importance 
of self-control emerges quite clearly. Shame is called up in someone, Rawls, explains 
particularly when “his conduct shows that he has failed to achieve the good of self-command” 
(130) and “its attendant excellences of strength, courage, and self-control” (ibid).  
Diana T. Meyers (1986) amends Rawls’s view to reintroduce a stronger element of 
control into the definition, arguing that in order to respect oneself, one must also value a life plan 
that is properly one’s own, not assigned from outside. She reiterates the importance of self-
control to respect in a later paper (1995), explaining that “[w]hoever warrants respect does so in 
virtue of his or her dignity as an agent or, in other words, in virtue of capacities to choose 
reflectively and to cultivate desirable dispositions to choose as opposed to natural endowments” 
(229). Gabriele Taylor (1995) argues, relatedly, that a person respects themself insofar as they 
act with integrity, and that “integrity comes down not to a specified set of virtues, but mostly to 
control, honesty with oneself and others about one’s evaluations and control of actions that 
matches with that” (165). 
So Kant is not alone in thinking that stepping back enough to control oneself is an 
important part of respecting oneself. In Kant’s case, this claim is motivated by his commitment 
to what I have been calling disharmony in human moral action. Some philosophers have worried, 
however, that the rationale underlying Kant’s commitment to holding oneself at arm’s length 
involves an improperly negative or dismissive view of human animality.65  In what follows, I 
                                                          
65 We can see from some of the recent scholars who have discussed self-respect that an emphasis on self-control on 
its own need not indicate that a philosopher considers aspects of human beings historically associated with animality 
and nature (instead of rationality) unimportant. Meyers’s (1995) development of what it means for a life plan to be 
one’s “own,” for instance, requires that the life plan in question be in line with one’s convictions and also one’s 
“affections” (85). 
             102 
 
will argue that Kant’s conception of self-respect does not have built into it the goal of becoming 
less animal and that his commitment to self-respect does not imply that being an animal is 
anything to be ashamed of.   
 
5. Respecting Oneself and Being an Animal 
 
Kant’s account of self-respect has been considered problematic. In particular, 
philosophers have raised the concern that Kant’s moral theory seeks out the wrong kind of 
relationship between human beings and their animality or physicality, encouraging people to 
value themselves only as disembodied and purely rational beings. To cite just two examples, 
Michael Neumann (2000) argues that Kant’s theory of respect cannot really involve respecting 
persons as we think of them precisely because of its focus on the moral self, at the expense of 
any value for the animal self. As Neumann explains: 
For [Kant], the object of respect is the noumenal [that is, the purely rational/moral] 
self, and the reason for respecting it is its rational nature. The empirical [or animal] 
self, on the other hand, has neither dignity nor intrinsic value. But virtually all our 
individuality and personality [in the everyday sense] are located in the empirical self. 
(294) 
 
Robin S. Dillon (1995) raises a similar concern, that on classical conceptions of self-respect, the 
self referred to is a “thin” or “generic” version of the self, one composed only of rights, 
consciousness, or rationality—something “disembodied” (295-6). This kind of self-respect, she 
writes, “is compatible with and even encourages self-alienation, for it allows that I can respect 
myself without paying attention to who I am, without taking me seriously” (296). 
 The idea here is that Kant, in his conception of what it means to respect oneself, relies 
upon the idea that there are two selves—the rational and the animal self. The key to self-respect 
             103 
 
would be to realize that the rational self is one’s true self, and to somehow remove oneself from 
or disown one’s animality and prioritize one’s purely rational self. This view would seem to 
imply that one’s animal self is isolated from the value of one’s moral self—an interfering thing 
to be discarded insofar as this is possible. There are commentators who read Kant as drawing a 
distinction between the real (moral-rational) and the less-real and ultimately not really 
consequential (animal) self. This comes out, for instance, in how some commentators read 
Kant’s theory of the sublime.  
For example, Paul Crowther (1991) explains the dynamical sublime as a feeling of relief 
(and hence, pleasure) that follows when we realize our initial impression that we cannot 
comprehend an object is, from the point of view of our purely rational selves, wrong (see 81). 
For Crowther, the key to this experience is our realization of “the ultimate authority and 
transcendence of our rational over our sensible being” (21). Paul Guyer (1993) also argues that 
the sublime is pleasurable to human beings because it confirms the “dominion of our rational 
personality over the threats of phenomenal nature” (208), such that even in the dynamic sublime 
(that is, experiences of the sublime that are called up by objects that could physically totally 
overwhelm or destroy us) comes about when the object of our fear is realized not really to be 
fearsome (213).66  
Not all commentators find this self-dividing and re-prioritizing way of understanding 
Kant appropriate even to Kant’s aesthetic writings. Katerina Deligiorgi (2014) argues against 
readings like this, which she calls “subsumptive” readings of the sublime. On these readings, 
                                                          
66 Henry Allison’s (2001) reading of the sublime does not quite make this move. Although he initially asserts that 
the sublime “evokes in us… a sense of our independence from, and superiority to, nature (both the sheer magnitude 
and power of external nature without and our sensuous nature within)” (306), he later clarifies that in order for 
Kant’s theory to make sense, he must show that “a subject can within one and the same aesthetic experience be 
aware both of an utter helplessness in the face of the power of nature and of an independence from this power” 
(329). 
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sublime experiences are pleasurable for us because although we initially experience sublime 
objects as violent or overwhelming, we then realize that our moral selves are free of this 
limitation and hence that our true selves are superior to these objects. As she points out, this 
reading seems to drop the negative aspect of our experience of the sublime, which is supposed to 
be a very important part of it.  
The reading of Kant on which he holds that respecting oneself is a matter of associating 
increasingly with one’s purely rational and not one’s animal self is also evident in the way 
commentators discuss the emergence of self-respect. Commentators tend to emphasize the 
connection between our self-respect and the pleasant awareness that we are rational, moral, and 
in some sense free from animality. For example, Owen Ware (2014) writes that our awareness 
“of our capacity to act independently of pathological incentives… [elicits] a kind of pleasure 
within us,” this being “the pleasure of self-respect….” (16). Anne Margaret Baxley (2010) also 
attributes our self-respect directly to awareness of the rational-moral aspect of ourselves. For 
instance, she draws the following inference: “Given that the very law eliciting our respect is one 
that we legislate to ourselves, respect for the moral law entails respect for oneself, or self-
esteem” (153).  
Inferences of this type are misleading. It is true that our respect for ourselves depends 
upon our awareness that we are moral and rational. But the repeated drawing of this inference in 
the literature masks another equally true inference—that because the law we legislate is also one 
that constrains us, our self-esteem takes the form of self-respect. In other words, in order to 
respect ourselves, we must also be aware of our animality. By passing over this aspect of self-
respect, commentators lend support to the conclusion that it is an important part of self-respect, 
for Kant, that human beings begin to think of themselves as more truly their rational than their 
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animal selves. Baxley, for instance, does hold that one important goal of Kantian moral behavior 
is to elevate ourselves over our sensibility and identify ourselves more closely with our rational 
self (122). 
And Kant does sometimes seem to indicate that we should deny our animality. For 
example, in a list of sayings that Kant claims “more or less” represent the duty to respect oneself, 
Kant includes: “crying out in bodily pain… is unworthy of you” (6:436). Crying out in bodily 
pain seems to be a paradigmatically fitting animal reaction to bodily harm, one that simply 
affirms the reality that harm to one’s body is harm to oneself. By claiming that this reaction is 
undignified, Kant seems to suggest that we ought to comport ourselves in a way that denies this 
obvious fact. 
But it cannot be Kant’s view that to respect oneself is to disown one’s animality. It is 
apparent in Kant’s moral writings that the fact that we are animals with bodies matters to our 
moral obligations. At the outset of his section on duties to oneself in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant explains that he will therein draw “a subjective division of a human being’s duties to 
himself” tracking “whether the subject of the duty (the human being) views himself both as an 
animal (natural) and a moral being or only as a moral being” (6:420). The fact that duties to 
oneself viewed as animal are included at all in Kant’s discussion speaks against completely 
ignoring one’s animality in one’s moral actions. Still, the distinction Kant draws here can give 
the impression that he is reinforcing the distinction between these two aspects of oneself as two 
“selves.” The first set of duties, we might think, is directed to the animal self, insofar as that self 
is instrumentally necessary for purely moral purposes, and the second set is directed to the purely 
rational self alone.  
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Kant cannot mean the distinction in this way, however. The very first duty he includes in 
his section on duties to oneself only as a moral being is a duty that concerns, and even seems to 
be owed to, one’s animal self: this is the duty to oneself not to lie. Here is how Kant explains the 
self-wrong involved in lying:  
The human being as a moral being… cannot use himself as a natural being… as a 
mere means (a speaking machine), as if his natural being were not bound to the inner 
end (of communicating thoughts)…. [The human being] is bound to the condition of 
using himself as a natural being in agreement with the declaration… of his moral 
being and is under obligation to himself to truthfulness. (6:430) 
 
In this passage Kant describes the wrongness of lying in terms of the human being’s use 
of himself as a natural being as a mere means. In other words, this violation is described by Kant 
in terms that make it seem like the violation is actually against what would usually be 
categorized as one’s animal self, suggesting that violations of this self can count as violations of 
oneself purely as a moral being. In addition, Kant’s analysis of this duty speaks directly against 
the idea that one ought to disown one’s animality. The instrumentalization of the animal self is 
so far from what Kant is endorsing here that such instrumentalization is actually included by him 
as a reason the action is wrong. The liar disrespects himself by fracturing himself, acting as 
though two aspects of himself—his natural animality on the one hand, and his moral being on the 
other—were two separate beings, one of which (the animal) was merely at the disposal of the 
other to be used for whatever purposes it might have. He acts as though his animality were not 
himself, and not subject to the same rules to which he as a whole person is subject. He treats his 
body like a “speaking machine,” an instrument separate from himself, which he can operate to 
make sounds that are not properly his. 
 What, then, can we make of Kant’s (subjective) distinction between duties to oneself as 
an animal and as a moral being? I propose that we read this distinction not as a distinction 
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between two selves who can be the focus of our moral obligations, but as a distinction between 
two valid concerns that attach to the very same self, who is both moral and animal. Our duties to 
ourselves as a natural animal are those duties we have to our moral-animal selves which have to 
do specifically with the fact that we are animal, deriving from facts about what is natural to us. In 
other words, these duties encapsulate those duties we have to ourselves because we are 
perishable, finite, beings, who need things like food and rest in order to survive and continue to 
act. Our duties to ourselves as a moral being alone are still duties to our same, single, moral-
animal selves, but they are duties to ourselves which have to do specifically with the fact that we 
are moral, deriving their specifics from facts about what it means to be a moral being in our 
(always animal) case.  
Returning to the case of lying, this counts as a violation of one’s duties to oneself as a 
moral being because lying involves using a moral animal being (oneself) as a mere means, 
stripping oneself (as animal) of moral importance. In a sense this is a violation “against” one’s 
“animal self,” but it is a violation particularly because our animal selves are moral. On my 
reading of Kant’s distinction between duties to oneself as a natural and as a moral being, there is 
no conceptual trouble with this reference to oneself as animal, so long as this duty to one’s 
animal self is one that is had because one’s animal self is a moral self.  
In her book Moral Self-Regard (2001), Lara Denis reads this case differently in part 
because of her different reading of the distinction between duties to oneself as a natural and as a 
moral being. In her reconstruction of Kant, Denis explains the wrongness involved in external 
lies (lies to others) and internal lies (lies to oneself) in different ways. Kant makes no note, as 
Denis does (92), that one form of lying is more difficult to justify as a wrong against oneself than 
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the other67—and his explanations throughout the passage suggest that he considers the wrong in 
both cases to be similar. For example, in the passage in which we might take Kant to be focusing 
more on external than internal lying (since it contains some mention of communicating to 
others), he cites the fact that lying makes one into “a mere deceptive appearance of a human 
being” (6:429). This comment fits neatly with the comment he makes in the passage I have 
included here about using oneself as a speaking machine, which occurs in the context of some 
more detail about lies to oneself. In both cases, the human being seems to have violated 
themselves by stripping what some commentators would call their two “selves” apart from each 
other, demoting the animal self to the status of mere tool. 
I do not agree with Denis that internal and external lies call for radically different 
analyses, but I will here compare my reading to each of her separate analyses, since both seem to 
leave out Kant’s mention of the natural (or animal) self. Working with the reading that duties to 
oneself as a moral being must be duties to one’s rational-moral, and not one’s animal, self, 
Denis’s explanation for the wrongness of internal lies is that they interfere with one’s ability to 
effectively reason and self-assess (since in lying to oneself, one muddles the information 
necessary for these tasks).68 Hence, these lies interfere with one’s rational capacities and thus 
violate one’s rational self. External lying, on the other hand, is taken to be a violation because in 
lying to others, we fail to express our rational self in the world. In that sense, we fail to fully 
respect it.  
Both of these analysis, it seems to me, require avoiding the parts of Kant’s language that 
state that the violation here has to do particularly with one’s use of one’s natural self as a mere 
                                                          
67 Although he does note that it is more difficult to explain how it is possible to lie to oneself (6:430). 
68 This explanation goes a fair bit past what Kant writes in the passage at hand. Kant makes no mention of the 
importance of accurate introspection for reasoning or self-assessment in the section on lying at all. 
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means and one’s making of oneself as appearance into mere deceptive appearance. The reading I 
have offered here, which makes the distinction between which self we are violating 
inconsequential and focuses instead on in what sense we are violating one and the same moral-
animal self, allows us to embrace the clear role that an obligation to a (moral) animal plays in 
Kant’s analysis. 
Kant’s discussion of lying indicates that he recognizes the morally problematic nature of 
trying to do things with oneself as animal that one would not tolerate done to oneself as moral. 
Self-dividing actions (like lying, as Kant describes it) can also be problematic in ways that go 
beyond what Kant says here. Bernard Boxill (1976) points to another such self-dividing action 
when he discusses the complications involved in pretending, for strategic reasons, to be servile.69 
If this pretense is too all-encompassing, Boxill argues, it may undermine the pretender’s own 
resolve that their servility truly is a pretense. As he puts it, the pretender must preserve his 
“knowledge of himself as self-respecting,” and this requires that he must at least sometimes 
“shed his mask” (69). Boxill’s argument for why shedding the servile mask is important focuses 
especially on how our communications with others and the legitimately grounded opinions of 
others can affect our own beliefs about ourselves. But part of the difficulty involved in wearing 
this kind of mask also comes from the same factor that Kant claims makes lying morally 
problematic in every case: that the animal being we use to “mask” in such cases is also the 
animal being we are. 
So far, I have focused on how Kant’s discussion of duties to oneself as a moral being 
alone supports identification with one’s animality as well as one’s morality. It is perhaps more 
                                                          
69 Kant mentions the fact that servility can be strategically employed in the sense that one can belittle oneself to gain 
favor from someone else (6:435-6), but that is not what is under discussion here. Boxill is thinking of cases in which 
a kind of lying servility is used strategically to undermine or resist attempts to force individuals into true servility. 
As far as I can tell, this kind of case does not occur to Kant. 
             110 
 
obvious how Kant’s commitment to duties to oneself as animal reveals a commitment to the 
human being as a unified moral-and-animal being. These are duties we have specifically because 
of the limits we incur from being natural animals. Considerations about these limits are 
important to our moral obligations because they are, in a morally relevant sense, limitations of 
us. It is part of our moral duty to treat ourselves as beings with such limitations not just because 
this is important for making sure we can do morally good things, when the opportunity arises, 
but because it is important for making sure we survive and thrive. There is an obligation not to 
commit suicide, according to Kant, because to kill one’s animal self is to kill oneself—and hence 
to “dispose of a human being” (4:429). Kant uses similar reasoning to insist that it is not 
permissible to take drugs or engage in other behaviors which partially incapacitate one’s animal 
body (6:427)—again, it is one’s own body, and in limiting oneself as an animal, one limits 
oneself full-stop.  
Some of Kant’s analyses of duties to oneself in this section also reveal a concern for 
acting in “natural” ways—or ways in accordance with what nature (metaphorically) intended. 
This concern for naturalness is precisely a concern for acting in ways that are sensitive to the 
health and well-being of ourselves as animals. Some of the duties that Kant derives on this basis 
are extreme and, I think, objectionable. For my purposes here, however, the important thing to 
note is that these errors on Kant’s part do not seem to stem from a hatred or rejection of animal 
things. Rather, they stem from a combination of a relatively strong commitment to the 
importance of looking after ourselves as animals and a rigid conception of what is required for 
and dangerous to animal health.70 Kant’s objection to masturbation, for instance, hinges on the 
                                                          
70 John H. Zammito’s work on Kant’s dabbling in the medical field provides further insight into Kant’s views about 
health and how his views were at odds with even much of the medical knowledge in his own day. See, for example, 
“Kant and the Medical Faculty: One ‘Conflict of the Faculties,’” forthcoming in Epoche. 
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claim that the impulse to sexual activity is naturally suited to reproduction (6:425). The way to 
correct Kant on his view, here, I suggest, would not have been to argue that there is nothing 
morally wrong with pleasure without further purpose, but to explain that masturbation and other 
kinds of non-procreative sexual activities serve many naturally important functions (stress 
reduction, social bonding, etc.) and are in ordinary cases helpful and not harmful to health.  
Kant’s discussion of duties to oneself as an animal affirms the significance of identifying 
with and understanding one’s animality—even if Kant himself sometimes seems to have failed 
on the second count. However, in keeping with the observation that one’s animal wants and 
needs, although real and one’s own, are not always and automatically morally good, what Kant 
does do throughout his whole section on duties to oneself is remind readers of the distinction 
between those things we must do for ourselves because we are moral animals and those things 
that we will likely or always want to do.  
For example, at the beginning of the section in which he lays out the obligation not to use 
food or drink “excessively,” we find the following disclaimer:  
Here the reason for considering this kind of excess a vice is not the harm or bodily 
pain (diseases) that a human being brings on himself by it; for then the principle by 
which it is to be counteracted would be one of well-being and comfort (and so of 
happiness), and such a principle can establish only a rule of prudence, never a duty—
at least not a direct duty. (6:427) 
 
Here, Kant does not suggest that considerations of happiness are not worth thinking about. He 
emphasizes, though, his commitment to the claim that to make oneself happy is not to make 
oneself good.  
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To make oneself good is also not (all on its own) to make oneself happy.71 Because we 
are not purely moral beings, the fact that making oneself happy is not the same as making oneself 
moral does not speak against its importance altogether. The following passage is instructive: 
Certainly, our well-being and woe count for a very great deal in the appraisal of our 
practical reason and, as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, all that 
counts is our happiness… but happiness is not the only thing that counts. (5:61) 
 
In this passage, Kant explains that “as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned,” that is, 
to the extent that we focus only on what we can derive from the fact that we are natural animal 
beings, our happiness is of supreme importance. The issue is that because we are natural beings 
who are also bound by morality, there is more to be derived, so to speak, and more that is of 
importance on top of this.    
In respecting ourselves, we do not identify more fully with our moral-rational self while 
disowning our animality. Rather, we acknowledge the disharmony between two things that are 
equally a part of us: our animal and our moral aspects. To respect ourselves, we must both be 
aware that our moral importance can outstrip our self-love and come to terms with the fact that 
we are beings who cannot be made fully happy and satisfied simply by doing what is morally 
best.  
To conclude my discussion of Kant on our tie to animality, I would like to note that this 
understanding of self-respect gives us at least one reason to think that it is important, for Kant, 
that respect be a feeling—something that involves us not only as moral-rational, but also as 
animal, beings. Commentators have disagreed about whether the truly effective part of our 
                                                          
71 See 5:126-7. Kant attributes to the Stoics the mistake of thinking that morality is sufficient for happiness and 
hence making the ideal virtuous agent “like a divinity in his consciousness of the excellence of his person, quite 
independent of nature (with respect to his own contentment), exposing himself to all the ills of life but not subjecting 
him to them” (5:127). Tellingly, since this also has to do with the human’s undivorceability from their body, he also 
cites his departure from the Stoics in his analysis of suicide (6:422). 
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respect for the moral law is a feeling or a rational judgment of what the moral law calls for.72 
What we have seen here, though, is that the feeling aspect of respect is certainly central to 
making respect what it is. Our experience of respect is not really passive—it is an experience 
called up by intellectual contemplation of the moral law or of those things which are obligations 
for us. But there is something in the fact that this law and these obligations strike us as 
obligations that is involuntary. Our animality enters into our moral awareness not by helping to 
guide us to our moral obligations by means of a natural grace, but by reminding us that our 
animality is part of us and that it is not perfectly morally harmonious. As Kant explains, our 
“consciousness of obligation depends upon moral feeling to make us aware of the constraint 
present in the thought of duty” (6:399, emphasis mine). Animality has the hardly dispensable 
role, in our moral experience, of reminding us of who and what we are. 
 
6. Self-Acceptance and Self-Respect 
 
Respecting oneself involves owning up to both one’s moral-rational and one’s animal 
aspects. It involves being honest about the disharmony between these aspects without fleeing 
into the illusion that one or the other of them is unreal. As Kant explains:  
[The human being] can and should value himself by a low as well as by a high 
standard…. Since he must regard himself not only as a person generally but also as a 
human being, that is, as a person who has duties his own reason lays upon him, his 
insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his 
dignity as a rational human being, and he should not disavow the moral self-esteem 
of such a being…. (6:435) 
                                                          
72 Some commentators see respect’s categorization by Kant as a feeling to be essential to its ability to move human 
beings to action. See Ina Goy’s (2007) and Stephen Darwall (2008), for example. Josephine Nauckhoff (2003) 
argues that respect as a feeling is necessary in order to combat weakness of will. Others, however, argue that it is the 
rational judgment that the moral law requires some action which does all of the moving of the agent in question, 
while the feeling accompanying this motion is something of a side-effect. See for example Paul Guyer (1993, 
ch.10); and Andrews Reath (2006). 
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Here, Kant does not claim that we ought to drop our lower standard of evaluating ourselves. We 
do not forget that we are beings who desire to be happy, and who are to a great degree at the 
mercy of nature. However, we also do not let that standard interfere with our moral assessment 
of ourselves. 
It might seem as though, given this characterization of self-respect, self-respect is not 
really a positive way of thinking about oneself at all. What is positive, we might ask, about 
acknowledging moral disharmony in oneself? Self-respect counts as a positive attitude about 
oneself because in it, we value ourselves while accepting ourselves. This stands in contrast to the 
way we value ourselves when we think self-conceitedly. It is obvious how self-conceit involves a 
failure to appreciate our moral-rational aspect, on Kant’s view. But it also involves a failure to 
appreciate our animal aspect. There is a sense in which self-conceited agents take their animal 
wants and needs very seriously. But self-conceited agents also conceive of themselves as holy 
animals with morally reliable impulses—animals that bear little resemblance to the unruly moral 
animals they actually are. Kant’s insistence that we cannot flatter ourselves into thinking we are 
holy beings is accompanied by the claim that can have respect for ourselves and thus value 
ourselves in full awareness of the fact that we are, in part, simply animals.  
In much of our thinking about self-respect, we focus on how self-respect requires us to 
stand up for ourselves and for our own moral importance. In his well-known paper “Servility and 
Self-Respect,” Thomas E. Hill Jr. (1991) lays out an account of the wrongness of servility as a 
failure of self-respect. According to Hill, the failure involved in servility is a failure “to 
acknowledge fully [one’s] own moral status because [one] does not fully understand what 
[one’s] rights are, how they can be waived, and when they can be forfeited” (9). The Kantian 
justification for the importance of this awareness, Hill explains, is that a failure to fully or 
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properly value one’s own rights is indicative of a general failure to properly value all rights 
(including the rights of others), and hence morality itself (13-14).  
Tommie Shelby (2012) also draws on the connection between self-respect and valuing 
oneself as a moral being, in his definition of self-respect as a pillar of virtue in the non-ideal 
circumstances of oppression:  
To possess self-respect, in the sense that concerns me here, means recognizing 
oneself as an object of respect. In particular, it means viewing oneself as a moral 
agent and moral equal with all others and valuing oneself accordingly. Self-
respecting persons insist on receiving just treatment, for they firmly believe that in 
virtue of their moral status they are entitled to such treatment. They do not believe 
that they must earn this treatment through, say, meritorious action or good character. 
They know that their capacity for moral agency alone is sufficient to establish their 
right to equal justice, and this conviction functions for them as an unshakable basis of 
self-worth. (527-528) 
 
The Kantian understanding of self-respect I have introduced here adds that it is an 
important component of properly valuing oneself as a moral being that one acknowledge how 
difficult doing this can be. Being an animal can be a wonderful experience, but it can also be a 
cruel one. We go on wanting and needing things even in conditions in which the only way we 
can acquire those things is by acting as we judge we ought not and shaking our commitment to 
our own moral value. We can be bombarded with desires we reject and stripped of desires we 
desperately need. Kant’s conception of self-respect, with its emphasis on disharmony, allows us 
to say something that seems true especially in such situations—that to demand of oneself that 
one gracefully like what one morally must do is actually, in a sense, a failure of self-respect.  
I think that Kant’s theory stands in need of modification if it is to fully acknowledge 
human non-ideality. Kant does not recognize all the particular kinds of hardships we encounter. 
For example, he does not seem to seriously entertain the possibility that one would have to help 
oneself remember the draw of one’s own happiness. I think the fact that we clearly can find 
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ourselves stripped of this drive implies that there is a category of duties to oneself as an animal 
that Kant never considers: one that has purely to do with looking out for one’s drive for life in 
the first place. The fragility of the human drive for happiness might imply, for instance, that 
one’s duties to oneself generate reasons to avoid experiences that are likely to strip the felt 
meaning from one’s life, like the betrayal of all one’s family and friends, even for some 
righteous cause. 
The case of Maria von Herbert, as recounted by Rae Langton (1992), may have called for 
the application of one such overlooked duty. Langton discusses the case of Maria von Herbert, a 
correspondent of Kant’s who was contemplating suicide after her confession that she was not a 
virgin irrevocably distanced her from a former friend and love interest. Kant, of course, holds 
that von Herbert has a duty to preserve herself. Because Kant assumes that the drive to happiness 
is inextirpable, his own development of the duty to preserve oneself focuses on things like 
feeding oneself adequately and not ending one’s own life. In von Herbert’s case, however, it 
seems plausible that her attention to her own preservation would have to have taken the form of 
attention to re-stimulating this naturally essential drive for happiness. In writing to Kant and 
asking to visit, a request he seems to have ignored, she may well have been trying to do just 
this.73 
This is just one example of how Kant’s understanding of how natural animality works 
could lead to errors in his account of living up to self-respect without his ever undervaluing 
animality itself. Such errors need not indicate that we should give up on the way Kant 
                                                          
73 Langton’s own suggestion for an unexpected duty that arises in von Herbert’s case is that, given von Herbert’s 
position in a thoroughly chauvinistic society, it may have been appropriate for von Herbert to excuse herself from 
the usual duty not to lie (in this case, about her virginity), given the terrible consequences honesty predictably held 
in her case. Langton’s argument for this conclusion is that in von Herbert’s social condition, she could predict that 
telling the truth would have a devastating effect on her ability to demand and maintain the respect that she was owed 
in virtue of her status as a moral being from others. On these grounds, Langton suggests, von Herbert may have had 
a duty to lie about this (504). 
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approaches self-valuing more generally. In particular, I think we ought to consider it a valuable 
feature of Kant’s moral theory that it faces up to the fact that moral action often does not come 
naturally to us.  
An important failing of self-conceit is that by attempting to leap immediately into a holy 
relationship with morality and ourselves, the self-conceited agent seems to imply that there is 
something intolerably defective about being in a respectful relationship to these. There is 
arguably something deficient and undesirable in the fact that our moral duty and our desire for 
happiness can come so apart from each other. Perhaps, as Kant says, we ought to strive for a 
world in which the disharmony that makes our moral experience so uniquely human is no longer 
present. Self-respect, in short, might not be everything that we want—morally or prudentially—
for ourselves, aspirationally. But I think that Kant is right that it is sometimes what we need, and 
that this is nothing to be ashamed about. It is sometimes important, in the struggles of a human 
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